Third parties lack locus standi to challenge a natural guardian’s application to sell a minor’s property.

The respondent–mother, Alpaben, acting as the natural guardian of her minor daughter Khushi, filed Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 7 of 2023 before the Principal District Judge, Morbi under Sections 20 and 29 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, seeking permission to sell the minor’s undivided share in agricultural land bearing Survey No. 92, situated at village Barwala, Morbi.

Alpaben’s husband, Chintalkumar, had died intestate, following which the property devolved upon Alpaben and the minor as Class-I heirs.

Pravinaben, the minor’s grandmother, and other relatives objected to the proposed sale, alleging, inter alia, that the sale was unnecessary and proposed at an inadequate price.

After recording evidence, the District Court conditionally permitted sale of the minor’s undivided share, directing that the minor’s sale proceeds be placed in a fixed deposit, with appropriate safeguards for her welfare.

The objectors invoked Article 227 of the Constitution seeking quashing of that order.

The Court applied Sections 6 and 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, under which the mother is the natural guardian after the father and may act for the minor’s benefit, but cannot sell or otherwise transfer the minor’s immovable property without prior court permission; permission may be granted only in a case of necessity or evident advantage to the minor.

Section 8(3) makes an unauthorised alienation voidable at the instance of the minor or a person claiming under the minor, while Section 8(5)(c) provides an appeal against an order refusing permission.

Sections 20 and 29 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 require judicial supervision over guardians and alienation of a minor’s property.

The Court relied on Garment Crafts v. Prakash Chand Goel , (2022) 4 SCC 181, and Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. , (2001) 8 SCC 97, holding that Article 227 is limited supervisory jurisdiction and is not an appellate power to reappreciate or reweigh evidence.

It also relied on Shephali Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal , 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 597, for the principles that the minor’s welfare is paramount, the guardian bears the burden of establishing necessity or demonstrable benefit, and the court must independently scrutinise the proposed transaction under the doctrine of parens patriae .

The High Court held that the District Court had jurisdiction to examine the application and had properly undertaken the required welfare-oriented scrutiny.

The evidence showed that Alpaben was a widowed, less-educated mother with no independent income and was unable to meet the minor’s educational and living expenses from the agricultural property, which was not generating agricultural produce for them.

The District Court had also considered the title and succession documents, found that the objectors had no established subsisting interest in the property, and imposed safeguards by directing investment of the minor’s proceeds in a fixed deposit.

Although the objectors alleged an undervalued sale, their challenge essentially invited the High Court to reassess evidence and substitute its own factual conclusion, which was impermissible under Article 227 absent perversity, jurisdictional error, or a flagrant violation of law.

The Court further held that the objectors lacked locus to challenge the guardian’s application, particularly since Section 8(3) protects the minor’s right to avoid an unauthorised alienation and does not confer an independent right on unrelated third parties to obstruct the proceedings.

On the facts, the proposed sale was found to advance the minor’s education, welfare, and financial security.

The petition was dismissed with costs of ₹10,000, payable to the minor Khushi within four weeks.

The petitioners were directed to place proof of payment before the District Legal Services Authority, Morbi; failing payment, the Authority was directed to issue a recovery certificate and recover the amount as arrears of land revenue for payment to the minor.

Any interim relief stood discontinued, and the request for continuation of interim protection after pronouncement was rejected.