Third-party impleadment is impermissible if it involves adjudicating independent causes of action or enlarging a suit’s scope.

The plaintiffs filed a suit for a decree of declaration claiming ownership of a 2.5-acre agricultural farm land (“suit property”) based on three Agreements to Sell (1990-1991) executed by the defendant’s late mother.

The defendant resisted the suit, alleging the documents were fabricated and noting that the plaintiffs lack original title deeds.

While the suit was pending, third-party applicants (the Malik family) moved an application under Order I Rule 10 of the CPC for impleadment.

The applicants claimed that the plaintiffs had entered into a subsequent Agreement to Sell with them in 2017 for ₹60 Crores, received ₹38.5 Crores, and handed over possession via a Possession Letter dated March 24, 2018.

The plaintiffs and defendant both opposed the impleadment, arguing a lack of privity of contract and that the applicants were neither necessary nor proper parties.

Whether third-party purchasers/agreement holders are necessary or proper parties to be impleaded in a title suit where the plaintiff seeks declaration of ownership against the original owner’s heir.

Whether the impleadment of the applicants would impermissibly enlarge the scope of the suit by introducing an independent cause of action.

The Court applied Order I Rule 10 of the CPC regarding the joinder of parties.

It relied on the "twin tests" for a necessary party established in Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal: (1) there must be a right to relief against such party regarding the controversy, and (2) no effective decree can be passed in their absence.

The Court emphasized the principle of dominus litis, where the plaintiff cannot be compelled to fight a party against their wish unless required by law, as affirmed in Gurmit Singh Bhatia v. Kiran Kant Robinson and Nak Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Tarun Keshrichand Shah.

It further distinguished Sumtibai v. Paras Finance Co., noting that a "semblance of title" only allows impleadment if it does not fundamentally alter the nature of the suit.

The Court reasoned that the applicants’ claim is based on a separate 2017 agreement with the plaintiffs, whereas the primary suit concerns the plaintiffs' 1990 agreement with the defendant’s mother.

The Court found these to be two "independent and diametrically distinctive causes of action".

It noted that the applicants derive their interest solely from the plaintiffs; therefore, they cannot have a better title than what the plaintiffs might establish in the main suit.

Adjudicating the applicants' rights would require the Court to settle a separate dispute involving different evidence and contracts, thereby expanding the suit's scope.

Since the plaintiffs claimed no relief against the applicants and an effective decree regarding the 1990 transaction could be passed without them, the applicants failed the "necessary party" test.

The Court answered that the dispute between the applicants and plaintiffs is a distinct matter to be settled in separate legal proceedings and cannot be joined to the current suit.

The suit was directed to proceed before the Joint Registrar on March 27, 2026.