Unexplained delay in filing appeal and prior compliance with the impugned order render the writ appeal non-maintainable.

The State of Chhattisgarh filed an intra-court appeal against a Single Judge’s order dated 23.09.2025 in WPS No. 2438 of 2021, which directed the Appellants to consider the Respondent’s application for compassionate appointment within 60 days

Along with the appeal, the State filed I.A. No. 01 of 2026 seeking condonation of a 184-day delay in filing

During proceedings, the Respondent’s counsel informed the Court that the State had already complied with the Single Judge’s order by considering and subsequently rejecting the representation, leading the Respondent to file a fresh writ petition (WPS No. 2101 of 2026)

1. Whether the delay of 184 days in filing the writ appeal could be condoned in the absence of a day-to-day explanation

2. Whether the writ appeal survived for consideration after the Appellants had already complied with the impugned order

The Court relied on a catena of Supreme Court precedents regarding delay and laches. It cited Union of India v. Tarsem Singh (2008), which established that belated service-related claims should generally be rejected unless they involve a "continuing wrong" that does not affect third-party rights

It further applied C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining (2008) and Surjeet Singh Sahni v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2022), which hold that mere filing of representations does not revive stale claims or extend limitation periods, and an unexplained delay warrants dismissal at the threshold

Additionally, it noted State of Orissa v. Laxmi Narayan Das (2023) regarding the fatal nature of unexplained laches in seeking judicial remedies

The Court found that the State failed to provide a sufficient day-to-day explanation for the 184-day delay, rendering the appeal barred by limitation

Applying the principles from Tarsem Singh and Surjeet Singh Sahni, the Court reasoned that it could not entertain the appeal due to these laches

Furthermore, the Court noted that the appeal had reached a stage of practical futility because the State had already acted upon the Single Judge’s directions by deciding (and rejecting) the Respondent's representation

Since the Respondent had already initiated a fresh legal challenge against that new rejection order, the issues arising from the original writ petition were deemed settled or superseded

It held that the appeal was both barred by unexplained delay and laches and had become infructuous due to the Appellants' compliance with the impugned order and the subsequent filing of a fresh writ petition by the Respondent