Unexplained Inordinate Delay in Enforcing a Contingent Contract Bars the Equitable Relief of Specific Performance

The Plaintiff/Respondent entered into an Agreement to Sell with the Defendant/Appellant on 13.07.1966 for a plot of land for Rs. 8,160/-, paying Rs. 1,700/- as earnest money

On 08.06.1967, a supplementary agreement was executed due to pending third-party litigation (Suit No. 802/1965) involving the Defendant; the Plaintiff paid an additional Rs. 3,200/-, totaling Rs. 4,900/-

The agreement stipulated that the Sale Deed would be executed within three months of the conclusion of said litigation, or failing that, the Defendant would sell his residential house (House No. 6, Jogabai) for the amount already received

The third-party litigation was decided on 03.09.1976, restraining the Defendant from transferring the land without partition

The Plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance in 1988, 22 years after the initial agreement

The Trial Court and First Appellate Court decreed the suit in favor of the Plaintiff regarding the residential house

1. Whether the findings of the lower courts were perverse and not based upon the evidence led by the parties?

2. Whether the Plaintiff was entitled to the equitable relief of Specific Performance 50 years after the initial agreement and 22 years after the cause of action?

The court applied Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which mandates that a plaintiff must plead and prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform the contract

Section 31 & 32 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 regarding contingent contracts, noting that if the event becomes impossible or legally impeded, the contract may become void

N.P. Thirugnanam v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, affirming that specific performance is a discretionary, equitable remedy

Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi, which held that suits for specific performance must be filed within a reasonable time, regardless of the three-year limitation period under the Limitation Act

The court found the lower courts erred in granting relief because the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate "readiness and willingness"

While the Plaintiff made vague assertions of readiness, he provided no evidence of financial capacity or active steps taken to monitor the litigation between 1966 and 1988

Regarding the "willingness" component, the court observed that the Plaintiff’s "deep slumber" for over 20 years indicated an absolute abandonment of the agreement

On limitation, the court noted the third-party litigation ended in 1976; the cause of action for the house arose three months later, making the 1988 suit blatantly barred by time

The court determined that granting specific performance after such a phenomenal increase in property prices and a 20-year delay would be inequitable and cause undue hardship to the Defendant

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgments of the lower courts and dismissing the Plaintiff's suit