Validity challenges to an existing PC Act sanction must be resolved during trial, not interlocutory revision.

The petitioners challenged the Special Judge’s common order dated 19 May 2026 dismissing their applications to discharge them or drop the proceedings on the ground that the prosecution sanctions under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act) were invalid.

The prosecution alleged that petitioner Dinesh Kumar, an Inspector and then SHO, and petitioner no. 2, a Head Constable, were involved in demanding a bribe; petitioner no. 2 was apprehended in a CBI trap.

A charge-sheet was filed under Section 61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and Section 7 of the PC Act, and sanction orders had been issued.

The petitioners contended that the sanctioning authority was not competent to remove them, relying, among other things, on Article 311 of the Constitution.

1. Whether the challenge to the competence of the authority granting sanction could be determined at the discharge stage, before evidence was led at trial.

2. Whether the revision petition could be entertained against the order refusing to discharge the petitioners or drop proceedings on the sanction objection, in view of Section 19(3)(c) of the PC Act.

Section 19(1) of the PC Act requires previous sanction from the specified authority before cognizance of the relevant offences against a public servant; Section 19(3)–(4) provides that an error, omission or irregularity in sanction—including the sanctioning authority’s competence—does not warrant interference unless it has occasioned a failure of justice, a question ordinarily assessed on the evidence.

In State of Bihar v. Rajmangal Ram, (2014) 11 SCC 388, the Supreme Court held that defective sanction does not justify interrupting a prosecution absent failure of justice.

Dinesh Kumar v. Chairman, Airport Authority of India, AIR 2012 SC 858, distinguishes absence of sanction, which may be raised at the threshold, from invalidity of an existing sanction, which may be challenged during trial.

CBI v. Ashok Kumar Aswal, (2015) 16 SCC 163, likewise treats prejudice from a sanction defect as a factual question generally left for trial.

Section 19(3)(c) bars revision in relation to an interlocutory order in the proceedings.

Sanction orders existed, so the petitioners’ objection concerned their validity, not the complete absence of sanction.

Whether a Deputy Commissioner or Joint Commissioner was competent to remove the petitioners required consideration of the Delhi Police Act, applicable rules and notifications, and relevant delegations; the Court held that this could not be resolved on the record at the discharge stage and required evidence.

Whether any defect caused a failure of justice under Section 19(3)–(4) also required assessment during trial.

The refusal to discharge did not finally determine the sanction objection and was interlocutory; revision was therefore barred by Section 19(3)(c).

Article 311 did not change that result, as the validity of the relevant statutory provisions and the competent removal authority remained matters to be determined in the proceedings.

It clarified that the petitioners remained at liberty to raise all objections to the validity of sanction, including the competence of the sanctioning authority, before the Special Judge during trial; those objections were to be decided on their merits and uninfluenced by the observations in either order.