Victim’s Father Said No One Pressured Him To Compromise; Chhattisgarh HC Acquits Man Of Section 201 Charge In Sexual-Assault Case

The appellant was convicted under Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for allegedly participating in a village panchayat and compromising a rape complaint to screen the offenders from punishment.

The trial court sentenced him to three years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹1,000

The victim alleged that she had been sexually assaulted by several men in January 2004; the prosecution’s case was that a panchayat meeting followed, at which the victim’s father was pressured to compromise.

During the appeal, co-accused were acquitted of the principal offence under Section 376(2)(g) IPC.

The appeal concerning co-appellant Pitarus abated following his death; the present appeal concerned Anjulus Khalkho.

Section 201 IPC requires proof that an offence was committed; that the accused knew or had reason to believe that it had been committed; that the accused caused evidence to disappear or gave false information; and that the act was done with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment.

That intention must be the accused’s primary and sole object, and suspicion or the mere likelihood that conduct may frustrate justice is insufficient (Sukhram v. State of Maharashtra, as quoted in Dinesh Kumar Kalidas Patel v. State of Gujarat).

Acquittal of the principal offender does not, by itself, bar conviction under Section 201 IPC if that section’s ingredients are independently proved (Dinesh Kumar Kalidas Patel).

The Court also relied on Sou. Vijaya alias Baby v. State of Maharashtra for the requirement of proof of knowledge and specific intent to screen the offender.

The Court held that acquittal of the principal accused did not automatically defeat the Section 201 charge, but found that the prosecution had not independently proved its elements.

The victim did not attend the panchayat and could not say what occurred there; her father acknowledged that many villagers attended, that he had not been pressured, and that he had sought money as a condition of compromise.

Other testimony did not establish that the appellant had authority in the village society or had prevented the family from reporting the offence; the victim’s mother was also unable to provide evidence about the meeting.

The evidence therefore failed to prove that the appellant knew of the offence and acted with the specific intention of screening an offender from punishment.

It answered the second issue in the appellant’s favour, finding the evidence insufficient to establish those ingredients beyond reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted by benefit of doubt.

His bail bonds were to continue for six months.