Without proof of demand and voluntary acceptance, recovery alone cannot sustain a corruption conviction.

The appellant, an Assistant Sub-Inspector, was convicted by the Additional Sessions & Special Judge, Gandhinagar, for offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i), (ii) and (iii) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

The prosecution alleged that, during an Anti-Corruption Bureau trap on 20 July 2000, the appellant demanded ₹50 from a jeep driver after initially referring to a ₹250 fine for carrying excess passengers, and accepted a tainted currency note.

The trial court sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment and fine.

In appeal, the appellant contended that demand and voluntary acceptance were not proved, relying particularly on the evidence of the decoy driver and panch witness, who stated that the appellant had not demanded a bribe and that the note had merely been tendered to him and fallen to the ground.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant demanded illegal gratification from the decoy witness.

Whether the prosecution proved the appellant’s voluntary acceptance of the tainted currency note as illegal gratification.

Whether the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act could be invoked in the absence of reliable proof of demand and acceptance.

Whether the trial court’s conviction and sentence warranted interference in appeal.

The Court applied Sections 7, 13(1)(d)(i), (ii) and (iii), 13(2), and 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

It held that proof of demand and acceptance or obtainment of illegal gratification is foundational to a conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d), and that mere recovery of tainted money is insufficient.

Relying on the Constitution Bench decision in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731, the Court reiterated that demand and acceptance may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence, but must first be established as facts in issue; the presumption under Section 20 arises only after the foundational facts are proved.

The Court also relied on Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa, AIR 1977 SC 170, and State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal, (1988) 4 SCC 302, for the principles that the prosecution bears the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is presumed innocent, and reasonable doubt must operate in the accused’s favour.

The Court found material contradictions among the evidence of the trapping officer, the decoy driver, and the panch witness.

The decoy driver expressly denied that the appellant had demanded or accepted a bribe and stated that he had attempted to tender the ₹50 note on his own, which the appellant refused and which then fell to the ground.

The panch witness gave substantially the same account and specifically stated that no bribe had been demanded; he was not declared hostile.

The panchnama and the trapping officer’s testimony, however, described a demand and acceptance of the note, creating a material conflict with the testimony of the two witnesses closest to the transaction.

Since the prosecution failed to establish reliable foundational facts of demand and voluntary acceptance, the presumption under Section 20 could not be raised.

The Court therefore held that the evidence did not meet the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

It acquitted and set the appellant free from all charges, cancelled the bail bond, directed refund of any fine paid, and ordered return of the record and proceedings to the trial court.