Writ courts will not reweigh evidence supporting registration absent perversity or jurisdictional error.

The petitioners challenged the District Registrar/Additional District Magistrate’s order dated 30 March 2017 directing registration of an agreement to sell dated 30 April 1989, allegedly executed by their father, Chotey Lal, in favour of respondent Nos. 4 and 5.

The Sub-Registrar had refused registration in 1990.

The petitioners’ father denied executing the agreement, and the petitioners alleged that his signatures had been misused.

The appellate proceedings included evidence from marginal witnesses and a handwriting expert; the authority found execution proved.

The petitioners also challenged the proceedings as improperly brought under Section 72 rather than Section 73 of the Registration Act, 1908, and alleged denial of an opportunity to complete their evidence.

Civil proceedings concerning the agreement and the parties’ substantive rights were also pending.

An intervenor claimed an independent interest in part of the land under a registered sale deed dated 17 August 1992.

Whether the District Registrar’s proceedings were maintainable, and the order valid, where the petitioners contended that denial of execution required proceedings under Section 73 rather than Section 72 of the Registration Act.

Whether the authority exceeded its jurisdiction or acted perversely by finding that Chotey Lal executed the agreement and directing its registration.

Whether the order should be quashed for breach of natural justice or non-consideration of the petitioners’ objections and evidence.

Whether the intervenor’s claimed independent interest in part of the land could be affected by the writ proceedings.

Sections 71–75 of the Registration Act, 1908 govern the statutory process for refusal of registration and the remedies available against such refusal; the Court considered the statutory scheme as a whole and held that an alleged error in describing the applicable provision does not, by itself, invalidate an order absent lack of substantive jurisdiction or substantial prejudice.

The registering authority may consider execution insofar as it is relevant to the statutory question of registration, but registration proceedings do not determine title or the ultimate enforceability of the underlying transaction.

Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court will not ordinarily reweigh evidence or substitute its view for that of a statutory authority where the finding rests on relevant material and is not perverse.

Natural justice requires a fair opportunity to be heard, not acceptance of a party’s case.

The Court treated the appeal as arising from the Sub-Registrar’s refusal to register the agreement and held that the authority had jurisdiction to examine the refusal under the statutory scheme; any defect in the initial statutory description did not establish invalidity or prejudice.

The finding of execution was supported by witness testimony, the handwriting expert’s opinion and other circumstances, so the Court declined to reassess their weight in writ jurisdiction.

It also found no demonstrated denial of a material opportunity to be heard, noting that the parties had participated, filed objections and placed evidence before the authority.

The disputed questions of fraud, consideration, execution, enforceability and title were left for the civil court.

As to the intervenor, the Court preserved his ability to establish any independent rights in the claimed portion before the competent forum.

It clarified that this did not determine the agreement’s ultimate validity, enforceability, specific performance or the parties’ final proprietary rights, which remained for the competent civil court.

The intervenor’s independent claim was likewise left open; the interim status quo order was vacated, subject to any orders of a competent court or forum.

No order as to costs was made.