A motor accident claim may be rejected where unexplained delay and witness conduct indicate vehicle implantation.

In brief

The question

1. Whether the claimants established, on a preponderance of probabilities, that the alleged vehicle was involved in the accident, or whether it had been falsely implicated.

The court held

The Court allowed the insurer’s appeal and set aside the Tribunal’s award, concluding that the offending vehicle had been falsely implicated and that the claimant witness’s conduct was doubtful.

It also directed

The Tribunal’s record was directed to remain intact.

01Facts

The appeal under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, challenged a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal award in favour of the claimants, on the ground that the insured vehicle had been falsely implicated.

¶ 1

The alleged accident occurred on 11 October 2016; the injured woman died on 3 November 2016, and the FIR identifying the offending vehicle was lodged on 12 February 2017.

¶ 2, 8

Her grandson, Ankit Verma, claimed to have witnessed the accident.

¶ 3

The insurer relied on the absence of any contemporaneous disclosure identifying the vehicle, including in the hospital records and the merg intimation, and on the delay in lodging the FIR.

¶ 6–8

The claimants relied on Anita Sharma v. The New India Assurance Company Limited concerning the applicable standard of proof in motor accident claims.

¶ 5

02Issues

i.1. Whether the claimants established, on a preponderance of probabilities, that the alleged vehicle was involved in the accident, or whether it had been falsely implicated.

¶ 3, 6–10

ii.2. Whether the Tribunal’s award should be set aside in light of the witness’s failure to explain the delayed disclosure and identification of the offending vehicle.

¶ 7–11

03Law Applied

Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, provides for an appeal against an award of a Claims Tribunal.

¶ 1

As stated in Anita Sharma v. The New India Assurance Company Limited, (2021) 1 SCC 171, motor accident claims are decided on a preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt; courts should assess the material on record rather than apply criminal-trial standards or fault claimants merely for not examining particular eyewitnesses.

¶ 5

That standard does not require acceptance of a claim where the evidence and surrounding circumstances undermine its credibility.

¶ 9

Provisions in the judgment · 1 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 Section 173

04Reasoning

The Court found Ankit Verma’s account doubtful because, despite claiming to have witnessed the accident and accompanying his grandmother, he gave no explanation for not identifying the offending vehicle to medical personnel, the police, or in the merg intimation.

¶ 6–8

The hospital prescriptions did not establish that he took her to hospital, and the Court noted that a police outpost was located within the hospital premises.

¶ 6–7

It also considered the approximately three-month delay between the death and the FIR identifying the vehicle unexplained.

¶ 8–10

On these circumstances, the Court treated Ankit Verma as a planted witness and concluded that the claim of vehicle involvement was not reliable, notwithstanding the standard of proof applicable to MACT claims.

¶ 9–10