After 4½ Years In Custody And Two Expired Trial Deadlines, Delhi HC Grants Bail To Murder Accused

The petitioner sought regular bail under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”) in a case alleging offences under Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) and Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act, 1959.

The prosecution alleged that, during an altercation on the night of 25–26 February 2022, the petitioner stabbed Sanjay while a co-accused held him; Sanjay later died of his injuries.

The petitioner was arrested on 26 February 2022.

This was his second bail application.

His first application was dismissed on 9 September 2025, with a request that the trial conclude within six months; in March 2026, the trial court was granted a further six months.

By the present application, the petitioner had been in custody for over four years and seven months.

Two alleged eyewitnesses had been examined and had not supported the prosecution, 14 of 30 prosecution witnesses had been examined, and the prescribed periods for concluding the trial had expired.

Section 483 BNSS confers on the High Court and Court of Session the power to grant bail; it corresponds to Section 439 CrPC.

Under Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav, a successive bail application may be considered where a change in the factual or legal situation calls for reconsideration.

Bail decisions require consideration of the nature and gravity of the accusation, the supporting evidence, the risk of witness interference, and the other relevant circumstances; the court must not assess witness credibility or reliability at the bail stage (State of Maharashtra v. Sitaram Popat Vetal; Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.); Satish Jaggi v. State of Chhattisgarh).

The right to a speedy trial is protected by Article 21, and serious charges alone do not justify continued detention where the trial has no foreseeable conclusion (Sheikh Javed Iqbal v. State of Uttar Pradesh).

The seriousness of the offence, though relevant, cannot by itself be the sole ground for refusing bail (Prabhakar Tewari v. State of U.P.).

The Court did not treat the eyewitnesses’ failure to support the prosecution as a new circumstance because that matter had already been considered when the first bail application was dismissed; nor did it reassess the prima facie material, including the alleged knife recovery and FSL report.

It instead found a material change in the petitioner’s circumstances: custody had exceeded four and a half years, both periods set for concluding the trial had expired, and the trial was unlikely to conclude soon.

The trial had progressed, with the two cited eyewitnesses examined and the remaining witnesses stated to be largely official or formal; the Court saw no realistic risk that the petitioner could influence them.

His satisfactory jail conduct, absence of another pending case, and compliance with prior interim-bail orders also weighed in his favour.

Applying the speedy-trial principles, the Court held that the seriousness of the charge and the prosecution’s reliance on the recovery and FSL evidence did not, in these circumstances, warrant continued detention pending a trial with no near-term conclusion.

Bail was subject to conditions including attendance at trial, restrictions on travel, disclosure of address and contact details, non-contact with prosecution witnesses, no interference with evidence or involvement in criminal activity, and reporting to the concerned SHO on the second and fourth Monday of each month.

The trial court was requested to expedite the proceedings; the Court clarified that its observations were confined to the bail application and would not affect the trial.