01Facts
The petitioner company held land originally granted by the State in 1978-79 (the "original grant").
The land was converted in 1996.
¶ 6 · p. 5In 2004 the converted land was sold to the petitioner under a registered sale deed.
¶ 6 · p. 5About ten years later, in 2014, resumption proceedings under the PTCL Act were initiated before the Assistant Commissioner, Bengaluru North Sub-Division (Case No. K.SC/ST 189/2014-15).
¶ 6 · p. 5The Assistant Commissioner allowed the proceedings and ordered resumption by order dated 14.11.2016.
¶ 2(b) · p. 3 · ¶ 6 · p. 5The Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District, dismissed the petitioner's appeal and affirmed by order dated 19.01.2026.
¶ 2(a) · p. 3 · ¶ 6 · p. 5The petitioner challenged both orders under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.
p. 1 · ¶ 2 · p. 3The Court noted that both authorities failed to consider the inordinate delay of nearly ten years in initiating resumption.
¶ 6 · p. 5The Court also recorded that the parties are referred to by generic descriptors because of recurring discrepancies in names, dates and survey numbers in such orders.
¶ 3 · p. 402Issues
i.1. Whether resumption proceedings under the PTCL Act can be sustained in respect of land that had been converted from granted land before its sale.
¶ 6 · pp. 5–6ii.2. Whether the authorities could entertain resumption proceedings initiated nearly ten years after the registered sale, without considering the inordinate delay.
¶ 6 · pp. 5–603Law Applied
The Court relied on the Prevention of Transfer of Certain Lands (PTCL) Act, 1978 (the "PTCL Act") and in particular Section 4(2), which governs permission for transfers of "granted land."
¶ 6 · pp. 5–6It applied the binding ruling of the Full Bench/Three-Judge Bench in W.P. No. 60483/2014 (the judgment refers to both descriptions).
¶ 6 · pp. 5–6That decision holds that land which has been diverted or converted no longer qualifies as "granted land" under the PTCL Act, so Section 4(2) permission is not required for such land and the resumption machinery cannot be invoked against it.
¶ 6 · pp. 5–6The unexplained delay of about ten years in initiating resumption is a relevant consideration that the authorities were bound to weigh.
¶ 6 · p. 5Provisions in the judgment · 1
Companies Act, 1956 Section 4
04Reasoning
Because the land was converted in 1996, before the 2004 sale, it ceased to be "granted land" under the PTCL Act.
¶ 6 · pp. 5–6The resumption proceedings of 2014 therefore had no statutory foundation, and the Assistant Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner could not have entertained the claim under the Full Bench ruling.
¶ 6 · p. 6The Court further faulted both authorities for not considering the roughly ten-year delay between the 2004 sale and the 2014 initiation of proceedings.
¶ 6 · p. 5The judgment does not state whether delay independently invalidates the proceedings or is merely an aggravating factor. Its finding that the orders "cannot be legally sustained" is framed "in the facts and circumstances of the case," which indicates that the conversion ruling was decisive and the delay supported the conclusion.
¶ 6 · p. 605Holding
In light of the binding Full Bench ruling, the Assistant Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner could not have entertained resumption of converted land, and the orders directing resumption cannot be sustained.
¶ 6 · p. 6 · ¶ 7 · p. 6The writ petition is allowed. A writ of certiorari issues quashing the Assistant Commissioner's order dated 14.11.2016 and the Deputy Commissioner's order dated 19.01.2026.
¶ 8 · p. 7The concerned authority is directed to mutate or restore the petitioner's name in the revenue records for the subject land.
¶ 8 · p. 7Interim orders stand discharged, and pending interlocutory applications, if any, are disposed of.
¶ 9 · p. 7Original Court PDF
M/S. DUO PROPERTIES PVT LTDvsTHE STATE OF KARNATAKA
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