Delhi HC Sends GB Pant Polytechnic Staff’s Fight Over Vacating Demolition-Targeted Quarters Back To Tribunal, Holding Government Housing Is A Service Matter

The petitioners, government employees residing in Type-II to Type-V quarters at the G.B. Pant Polytechnic Residential Campus, challenged a DTTE Office Memorandum dated 7 April 2026 inviting applications to shift to other government accommodation, as the quarters were proposed to be demolished.

They did not oppose the proposed redevelopment but sought phased relocation and permission to remain in their quarters until they were required for redevelopment.

The Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) held that the dispute was outside its jurisdiction and, in doing so, also commented on the redevelopment plan.

The petitioners challenged that order before the High Court.

Section 14(1)(c) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 extends the CAT’s jurisdiction to service matters concerning persons appointed to the specified civil services or civil posts.

Section 3(q) defines “service matters” broadly to include matters relating to an employee’s conditions of service.

In State of M.P. v. Shardul Singh, (1970) 1 SCC 108, the Supreme Court explained that conditions of service encompass an employee’s terms and conditions of service from recruitment through retirement, and thereafter to the extent they relate to the service rendered.

The High Court held that the petitioners were pursuing individual grievances, not a public-interest claim, because they sought relief concerning the quarters in which they themselves resided.

Since the government accommodation had been allotted to them as a condition attending their service, a dispute over their entitlement to that accommodation—including a direction to vacate—concerned their conditions of service and therefore fell within the meaning of “service matter” under Section 3(q).

The CAT was consequently wrong to decline jurisdiction.

Separately, once the CAT had concluded that it lacked jurisdiction, it should not have proceeded to express views on the merits of the redevelopment issue.

It set aside the CAT’s order and remanded the application for de novo consideration, directing that the decision be made uninfluenced by the observations in the impugned order, including those in paragraph 8.

The parties were directed to appear before the CAT on 30 October 2026, with no adjournment to be sought on that date; the CAT was requested to deal with the matter expeditiously.

The writ petition was allowed to that extent, with no order as to costs.