Delhi HC Sets Aside Eviction Order For Now, Remands Case After ARC Failed To Consider Tenant’s Claim Landlord Re-Rented 5 Shops

In brief

The question

1. Whether the Rent Controller’s failure to consider material averments in a rejoinder, which had been taken on record and noted in the eviction order, warranted interference under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act

The court held

The High Court set aside the eviction order and remanded the matter to the Rent Controller for fresh, de novo consideration on the existing record

It also directed

It expressed no view on the merits or veracity of the re-letting allegations and directed the Controller to determine the leave-to-defend application independently, uninfluenced by the High Court’s observations

The petition and pending applications were disposed of

01Facts

The petitioner challenged an eviction order dated 27 March 2026 under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.

Before the Rent Controller, she had filed a rejoinder alleging that the respondent had re-let five shops that he had earlier obtained vacant possession of.

¶ 4–7, 15–17

She stated that the rejoinder identified the alleged tenants and included photographs and lease deeds.

¶ 4–7, 15–17

The Controller noted that the rejoinder was on record but did not address those allegations.

¶ 4–7, 15–17

The respondent argued that the rejoinder could not introduce grounds beyond those raised within the statutory 15-day period for seeking leave to defend.

¶ 4–7, 15–17

02Issues

i.1. Whether the Rent Controller’s failure to consider material averments in a rejoinder, which had been taken on record and noted in the eviction order, warranted interference under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act

¶ 14–19

ii.2. Whether the alleged re-letting contentions in the rejoinder impermissibly introduced a new ground of defence after the statutory period for seeking leave to defend

¶ 16

03Law Applied

Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act confers supervisory and revisional, not appellate, jurisdiction on the High Court; the Court does not reappreciate evidence or substitute its view for that of the Rent Controller, but may intervene for jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity, an erroneous premise of law, or failure to adjudicate a material issue

¶ 9–14

The Court relied on Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119; Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78; and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30, as well as Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover, for the limited scope of revisional scrutiny

¶ 10–13

In proceedings under Section 25-B, a rejoinder cannot be used to add a new ground of defence after the prescribed period, but may provide particulars and supporting material for a defence already raised

¶ 16

Provisions in the judgment · 1 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 151

04Reasoning

The allegations in the rejoinder concerning the other shops were treated as particulars and supporting assertions for a defence already raised, rather than an altogether new ground; considering them therefore did not enlarge the defence beyond the statutory period

¶ 16

Since the Controller had permitted the rejoinder to be placed on record and expressly noted it, the Controller was required to assess the relevance and evidentiary value of its material averments and give reasons for accepting or rejecting them.

¶ 17–19

The failure to do so left a material aspect of the defence unadjudicated, amounting to an infirmity in the decision-making process within the narrow scope of Section 25-B(8)

¶ 17–19