Gauhati HC Quashes Contract Engineer’s MGNREGA Termination: He Was Punished On BDO Inquiry Where He Was Only A Witness

The petitioner was appointed as an Accredited Engineer on a contractual basis in March 2019.

Following allegations of improper implementation of four MGNREGA fishery schemes, he received a show-cause notice and submitted a reply denying responsibility and explaining his role.

Although a departmental proceeding against him had been initiated, the record did not show that it concluded in an inquiry report. Instead, the Commissioner terminated him by order dated 25 February 2024, relying on an inquiry into a separate proceeding against the Block Development Officer, in which the petitioner had appeared as a defence witness.

The termination order found him guilty of gross negligence and misappropriation, invoked Rule 3(1) of the Assam Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965, and stated that it was passed ex parte.

The petitioner challenged the termination under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Article 311 of the Constitution requires procedural protection where termination is founded on alleged misconduct and is stigmatic, notwithstanding the employee’s contractual status, as discussed with reference to Swati Priyadarshini v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Srinivas Ganesh v. Union of India.

A departmental inquiry may be dispensed with where the employee makes a specific, unconditional, unqualified, and unequivocal admission of guilt; an explanatory or qualified statement is not such an admission.

The Court relied on Ghanshyam v. State of M.P., 2013 (1) MPLJ 144, and Jagdish Prasad Saxena v. State of Madhya Bharat, AIR 1961 SC 1070, on the need for a formal inquiry absent a clear admission.

The termination order also referred to Rule 3(1) of the Assam Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965.

The Court read the petitioner’s reply as an explanation disputing responsibility, not as an unconditional admission of guilt; he asserted that the schemes had been implemented and attributed any lapses to others.

A formal inquiry was therefore required.

The record showed no completed inquiry against the petitioner; the inquiry report relied on concerned the BDO, and the petitioner had participated in it only as a defence witness.

Because the termination order nevertheless attributed gross negligence and misappropriation to him and was stated to be ex parte, the Court found that the order was stigmatic and had been made without the required inquiry and hearing.

The petition was disposed of, with the Court observing that, although the petitioner was a contractual employee, the department remained at liberty to continue his services.