Instagram Post On Maravar-Mutharaiyar Clash Could Prima Facie Promote Enmity: Madras HC Keeps IPC 505(2) Probe, Quashes 3 Other Offences

The petitioner sought to quash an FIR registered on 12 April 2023 under Sections 153, 504 and 505(2) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2008.

The FIR concerned an Instagram status posted after a recent clash between the Maravar and Mutharaiyar communities.

The post described one community as having beaten and chased away the other, referred to a death and an injured person, and warned that those who engaged in “unnecessary” conduct would meet the same fate.

The complainant, a police constable monitoring social media, was not alleged to have been personally insulted.

The petitioner argued, among other things, that the prosecution was time-barred because no final report had been filed within three years.

Under Sections 468(2) and 468(3) CrPC, the limitation period for offences punishable with imprisonment up to three years is three years; under Section 469, that period is calculated from the prescribed commencement date.

Following Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, as affirmed in Amritlal v. Shantilal Soni, Ghanshyam Soni v. State and Roma Ahuja v. State, the relevant date is the filing of the complaint or institution of criminal proceedings—not the date of cognizance or filing of the final report; for a police case, lodging the FIR initiates proceedings.

Section 67 of the Information Technology Act requires electronic material that is lascivious, appeals to prurient interest, or tends to deprave and corrupt.

Section 504 IPC requires intentional insult and provocation directed to the person concerned; the Court applied the principle that the insult must be communicated directly to the victim.

Section 153 IPC requires malicious or wanton provocation, by an illegal act, intended or likely to cause rioting.

Section 505(2) IPC covers statements or reports made, published or circulated with intent to create or promote, or which are likely to create or promote, enmity, hatred or ill-will between specified groups; intention is an essential ingredient, and the words are assessed as a whole.

Section 473 CrPC permits cognizance after limitation where necessary in the interests of justice, while Section 196(1-A) CrPC requires previous sanction for the relevant offence.

The FIR was registered within half an hour of the alleged occurrence, so the proceedings were instituted within time; the later filing of a final report did not attract Section 468 CrPC.

The post contained no allegation of obscene or lascivious material, excluding Section 67.

It identified no individual as the object of insult, and the complainant was a constable monitoring social media, not the person allegedly insulted; Section 504 was therefore not made out.

The FIR also alleged no illegal act giving provocation to riot, gathering addressed, or ensuing riot or attempt, so the requirements of Section 153 were absent.

By contrast, read as a whole and in the context of a recently subsided inter-community clash, the post’s account of violence and warning about the fate of those who engaged in “unnecessary” conduct was prima facie capable of promoting enmity between the communities.

Whether the words were intended as a call for friendship, and their meaning in the local context, were matters for trial.

The post’s temporary availability did not undo publication once made.

It partly allowed the petition, quashed the FIR insofar as it related to Sections 153 and 504 IPC and Section 67, and permitted the investigation to continue only under Section 505(2) IPC.

The police were directed to complete the investigation and file a final report within three months; any final report for Section 505(2) was to be filed only after obtaining the previous sanction required by Section 196(1-A) CrPC.

The petitioner remained at liberty to raise available pleas, including under Sections 196, 468 and 473 CrPC, before the trial court.