01Facts
The petitioners, Kirti Kantilal Mehta and his sons Pratik K. Mehta and Vinay K. Mehta (Accused Nos. 1 to 3 in all cases), entered into a Joint Development Agreement dated 14.05.2015 with the complainants, and separate Memoranda of Agreement of Sale dated 15.07.2015, 01.12.2015 and 03.07.2015.
¶ 6The complainants alleged receipt of Rs.1,80,00,000 (Crl.P. 6341/2020), Rs.76,50,000 (Crl.P. 6342/2020) and Rs.15,00,000 (Crl.P. 6419/2020) for constructing a commercial complex, which was not built.
¶ 5 · ¶ 18Charge sheets or FIRs were registered for offences under Sections 120B and 420 read with Section 34 IPC, in C.C. Nos. 10121/2019, 10124/2019 and 10128/2019.
¶ 1–3The petitioners contended that they resigned on 24.02.2016 and reconstituted the partnership.
¶ 6The petitioners further stated that Rs.3 crore was paid under the JDA, that a refund notice was issued, that the company is in liquidation, and that a claim has been lodged before the Liquidator.
¶ 7The complainants were parties to the agreements, and Clause 34 of the Memorandum of Agreement of Sale provides for reference of disputes to a sole Arbitrator.
¶ 19The attesting witnesses to the agreements were not cited as witnesses in the charge sheets.
¶ 6 · ¶ 23The State contended that the transactions revealed an intention to cheat at inception and a conspiracy among the accused.
¶ 1602Issues
i.1. Whether the petitioners have made out grounds to invoke Section 482 CrPC to quash the complaints, FIRs and charge sheets for offences under Sections 120B and 420 read with Section 34 IPC in all three cases.
¶ 17ii.2. Whether a dispute arising from a Joint Development Agreement and Memorandum of Agreement of Sale, which contains an arbitration clause and where the complainants are parties, can be given criminal colour so as to constitute cheating, thereby amounting to abuse of the process of court.
¶ 19–22 · ¶ 2403Law Applied
Section 482 CrPC is the source of inherent power to prevent abuse of process.
¶ 24Section 420 IPC requires dishonest inducement and an intention to cheat at the inception of the transaction.
¶ 21 · ¶ 22The Supreme Court's distinction between civil breach of contract and criminal cheating or breach of trust, as stated in Delhi Race Club.
¶ 21 · ¶ 22Arshad Neyaz Khan v. State of Jharkhand, on the scope of Sections 406 and 420 IPC.
¶ 9Naresh Kumar v. State of Karnataka and Radheyshyam v. State of Rajasthan, on criminal proceedings arising from contractual breach.
¶ 10Lalit Chaturvedi v. State of U.P., on refund notice and criminal prosecution.
¶ 11Dinesh Gupta v. State of U.P., on monetary transactions.
¶ 12Vijay Kumar Ghai v. State of West Bengal, Mitesh Kumar J. Sha v. State of Karnataka and Vesa Holdings v. State of Kerala, on breach of contract not amounting to criminal offences.
¶ 13Clause 34 of the Memorandum of Agreement of Sale, providing for arbitration as a binding alternative remedy.
¶ 19Section 120B IPC is dependent on the cheating allegation.
¶ 15 · ¶ 16Provisions in the judgment · 5 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860 Section 420Section 34Section 406Section 114
04Reasoning
The specific accusations of collecting money for a commercial complex and not constructing it were rooted in agreements executed with the complainants' consent.
¶ 18 · ¶ 19Because the complainants were parties to the JDA and MoAS, and Clause 34 provided for arbitration, any breach was a contractual dispute that should have been resolved through that mechanism rather than criminal prosecution.
¶ 19 · ¶ 20The court treated the refund notice, the pending liquidation and the claim before the Liquidator as matters for civil adjudication.
¶ 19Although the State argued that non-construction showed intent to cheat from inception, the court found no material establishing such intention at the inception, noting that attesting witnesses were not examined and that the dispute was civil in character.
¶ 16 · ¶ 22 · ¶ 23Applying the distinction drawn in Delhi Race Club, the court concluded that continuing the prosecution would give criminal colour to a civil dispute and amount to abuse of process, which warranted interference under Section 482 CrPC.
¶ 21 · ¶ 22 · ¶ 24The court did not separately analyse the Section 120B conspiracy allegation, nor expressly discuss the petitioners' resignation and reconstitution of the partnership, which rested on the cheating finding.
05Holding
The petitioners made out grounds for quashing, since the dispute between the parties was civil in nature, governed by an arbitration clause, and no criminal intention at inception was shown. Both issues are answered in the affirmative.
¶ 22 · ¶ 24The criminal petitions were allowed, and the proceedings in C.C. No. 10121/2019, FIR in Cr. No. 97/2018 (C.C. No. 10124/2019), and C.C. No. 10128/2019, for offences under Sections 120B and 420 read with Section 34 IPC, were quashed.
¶ 25Original Court PDF
SRI. KIRTI KANTILAL MEHTAvsSTATE BY SHESHADRIPURAM POLICE
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