01Facts
The prosecution alleged that on 15.08.2018, the accused, knowing the complainant's daughter (PW-1, aged 16 years 3 months) was a minor, took her on his motorcycle from Government Hospital, Vijayapura, and travelled to Sindagi, Afzalpur, Kalaburagi and Bengaluru, where he allegedly raped her between 16.08.2018 and 18.08.2018.
¶ 2 · ¶ 14 · ¶ 32A complaint was lodged, and Crime No. 33/2018 was registered under Sections 363 and 376(2)(i) IPC read with Sections 4 and 6 POCSO Act.
¶ 3The prosecution examined 20 witnesses and marked 27 exhibits and two material objects.
¶ 5PW-1's Section 164 CrPC statement recorded that she left voluntarily and that the accused did not kidnap or induce her.
¶ 22 · ¶ 23PW-1 admitted that she had called the accused to the meeting point and had packed her clothes.
¶ 14 · ¶ 26 · ¶ 23The mother (PW-8) and brother (PW-6) gave contradictory accounts of who retrieved the girl from Bengaluru.
¶ 24 · ¶ 25The motorcycle used between Ganihar and Sindagi was not seized, and the son of the accused's uncle was not examined.
¶ 27No material established that Rs. 4,50,000 was kept at the complainant's house.
¶ 28The medical examiner (PW-15) found no genital injuries and no recent signs of sexual intercourse.
¶ 37 · ¶ 38The Trial Court acquitted the accused under Section 235(1) CrPC on 10.01.2023.
¶ 7The State appealed under Section 378(1) and (3) CrPC.
¶ 1 · ¶ 802Issues
i.1. Whether the State proves that the Trial Court's judgment of acquittal under Sections 363 and 376(2)(i) IPC and Sections 4 and 6 POCSO Act is arbitrary and erroneous, warranting interference in appeal.
¶ 11ii.2. Whether the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act applies to displace the accused's presumption of innocence where the foundational facts of penetrative sexual assault are not established.
¶ 32 · ¶ 33 · ¶ 35 · ¶ 36iii.3. Whether the victim's voluntary departure with the accused amounts to "kidnapping" under Section 363 IPC.
¶ 5403Law Applied
The Court applied Section 378 CrPC, which permits appeals against acquittal.
¶ 1 · ¶ 8Appellate courts may re-appreciate evidence but must interfere only where the Trial Court's view is not a possible one, as laid down in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka and Tota Singh v. State of Punjab.
¶ 40 · ¶ 43 · ¶ 44Where two views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must be adopted, and acquittal reinforces the presumption of innocence, following Sharad Birdhichand Sarda, State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, Surajpal Singh, Ramanand Yadav and C.K. Dase Gowda.
¶ 41 · ¶ 45 · ¶ 46 · ¶ 53Section 29 of the POCSO Act creates a presumption of commission of offences under Sections 3, 5, 7 and 9 that is rebuttable and applies only once the prosecution first establishes the foundational facts, following Mahadevu @ Pappi v. State of Karnataka and Debraj Dutta v. State of West Bengal.
¶ 33–36 · ¶ 52A statutory presumption does not absolve courts from analysing evidence, as held in Deepak v. State NCT of Delhi.
¶ 47A promise of marriage does not by itself constitute rape absent a false promise made from the outset that directly induced consent, as held in Nitin B. Nikhare.
¶ 49Conviction cannot rest on immorality or surmise without clinching evidence, as held in Paramjit Singh Bedi.
¶ 51Medical evidence and inconsistencies that cumulatively create reasonable doubt can render a conviction unsafe, as held in Jaspal Singh v. State of Punjab.
¶ 50Provisions in the judgment · 16 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 Section 419
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 164Section 235Section 313Section 378Section 417
Indian Penal Code, 1860 Section 363Section 366Section 376
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 Section 3Section 4Section 5Section 6Section 7Section 9Section 29
04Reasoning
The Section 29 presumption is not absolute and cannot operate where the prosecution has not established the foundational facts.
¶ 34–36The medical evidence was found fatal to the rape and penetrative assault charges, as there were no genital injuries, an intact hymen, and no recent signs of intercourse.
¶ 37–38PW-1's Section 164 statement described voluntary departure without inducement, and her in-court testimony was an improvement on it.
¶ 22–23Her admissions that she initiated contact, arranged the meeting, and packed her belongings supported voluntary departure rather than kidnapping.
¶ 14 · ¶ 26 · ¶ 54Contradictions between PW-6 and PW-8 regarding the recovery, the failure to seize the motorcycle or examine the relevant witness, the absence of proof of the Rs. 4,50,000 cash, and the unproven land-sale consideration were relied upon.
¶ 24–25 · ¶ 27 · ¶ 28 · ¶ 31Because the Trial Court's view was a plausible reading of the evidence, it could not be disturbed merely because another view was possible.
¶ 39 · ¶ 55The victim's age was undisputed, but age alone did not establish the offences once the evidence on consent and penetration failed.
¶ 3205Holding
The Court answered Point No. 1 in the negative, holding that the State failed to show the acquittal was arbitrary or erroneous.
¶ 57The victim's voluntary departure without inducement did not constitute kidnapping, and the absence of medical corroboration defeated the rape and POCSO charges.
¶ 54The Trial Court's acquittal was rightly granted.
¶ 55–56The Criminal Appeal is dismissed, and the judgment of acquittal dated 10.01.2023 in Special Case (POCSO) No. 43/2018 is confirmed.
¶ 58Original Court PDF
THE STATE OF KARNATAKAvsMALAPPA
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