Mining leases commence upon registration of the duly executed lease deed, not upon delivery of possession.

The State granted the respondent a sand-mining lease under the West Bengal Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 2016.

The lease deed was registered on 18 June 2021, while possession of the land was handed over on 27 April 2022.

The respondent later applied for extension of the five-year lease on 20 March 2025.

The Single Judge directed the State to communicate that the lease period should run from the date possession was handed over, rather than from registration of the deed.

The State appealed.

The Division Bench condoned the delay in filing the appeal, finding the explanation of intra-departmental file movement plausible.

Whether the commencement date of the respondent’s mining lease was the date of registration of the lease deed or the date possession was handed over.

Whether the Single Judge was justified in directing the State to treat the date of handing over possession as the commencement date, rather than leaving that question to be considered in deciding the extension application.

Whether the State was required to decide the respondent’s pending extension application.

Rule 5(2) of the West Bengal Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 2016, Rule 10(6) of the West Bengal Minor Minerals (Auction) Rules, 2016, and Rule 5(2) of the West Bengal Sand (Mining, Transportation, Storage and Sale) Rules, 2021 provide that the lease commences upon registration of the duly executed lease deed.

Rule 21 of the 2016 Concession Rules concerns lapsing where mining operations do not commence within the prescribed period; that distinct question does not determine the commencement date for calculating the term of a lease that has run its course.

The court held that the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and general principles of equity could not displace the specific rules governing this statutory mining lease.

It distinguished *Lachman Shaw v. State of West Bengal & Ors.* because that decision concerned the predecessor rule on lapsing, and found no relevant ratio on the governing rules in the coordinate Bench decision in FMA 1656 of 2013.

The lease deed’s force-majeure clause applied to delay-related consequences in the context of alleged breach or termination; it did not establish the commencement date in this case.

The applicable rules expressly fixed registration of the duly executed deed as the lease’s commencement date.

The court therefore rejected the respondent’s reliance on possession, the Transfer of Property Act, equity, and the cited decisions to establish a different commencement date.

It also held that the force-majeure clause did not assist the respondent because the lease had not been terminated and no force-majeure ground had been raised.

Since the writ petition concerned, in substance, the State’s failure to decide the extension application, the Single Judge had gone beyond that issue by conclusively fixing the lease period’s commencement date; the question could not be pre-judged in that proceeding.

However, the State remained obliged to decide the pending extension application within a reasonable time.

The direction requiring the State to treat the date of handing over possession as the lease’s commencement date was set aside.

The State was directed to decide the respondent’s extension application by a reasoned written order, preferably by 30 November 2026, after giving the respondent an opportunity to be heard if the application was to be rejected.

The court left the merits of the extension application open and directed that it be considered in accordance with law, treating 18 June 2021—the date of registration—as the commencement date.

CAN 2 of 2026 was disposed of, with no order as to costs.