Mother’s Challenge to Property Settlement in Favour of Cousin’s Son Fails as Madras HC Finds Suit Filed Nearly 5 Years Later

Chellammal, the first plaintiff, owned the suit property under a 1980 sale deed. In 2010, she executed a registered settlement deed in favour of Vivek, her cousin’s son.

She later claimed the deed was procured through undue influence and was intended only as a temporary arrangement during a family dispute. In 2013, she unilaterally cancelled the settlement and settled the property on her daughter, Kanimozhi.

Vivek had meanwhile mortgaged the property to Senthilpandian. Chellammal and Kanimozhi sued to challenge the 2010 settlement and mortgage and to establish the validity of the cancellation and subsequent settlement. Vivek brought a separate suit challenging the cancellation and subsequent settlement.

After a joint trial, the trial court dismissed the first suit and decreed Vivek’s suit; the plaintiffs appealed.

Under Order VI Rule 4 CPC, undue influence must be specifically pleaded with particulars; a close relationship or influence alone does not establish undue influence. The party alleging it bears the initial burden, which may shift where the requisite position of domination and an apparently unconscionable transaction are established under Section 16 of the Contract Act.

The court relied on the presumption attaching to a registered document and the principle in Prem Singh v. Birbal that a registered document is prima facie valid, subject to rebuttal.

Under Sections 122 and 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, the court treated a settlement in the nature of a gift as requiring acceptance and registration; non-delivery of possession or failure to mutate revenue records does not, by itself, invalidate the transfer, relying on K. Balakrishnan v. K. Kamalam.

Section 126 TPA limits revocation of a gift; an unconditional settlement cannot be revoked unilaterally merely at the donor’s will, and an aggrieved executant must seek relief through a civil court.

The court applied Article 59 of the Limitation Act to the challenge to the settlement and Section 3 of that Act in considering limitation even without a pleaded defence.

It also considered Order VIII Rules 3–5 CPC on specific denials and deemed admissions.

The court found that Chellammal admitted executing the registered settlement deed, while the pleadings and evidence did not establish that Jagadeesan dominated her will, misused that position, or obtained an unfair advantage. The deed’s unconditional recitals and the absence of sufficiently particularised proof defeated the undue-influence claim; the lack of possession transfer or revenue mutation did not make the deed ineffective.

Because the settlement remained valid, Chellammal had no power to cancel it unilaterally, and her subsequent settlement in favour of Kanimozhi could not confer title.

The court further held that Chellammal, as executant, knew of the 2010 deed on its execution; the 2014 suit was therefore outside the three-year period it applied under Article 59.

The alleged defects in the written statement did not alter the result, as the court concluded that the defendant had denied the plaintiffs’ case and that the evidence did not support their claims.

Both appeals were dismissed, and the trial court’s common judgment and decree dismissing O.S. No. 12 of 2015 and decreeing O.S. No. 224 of 2017 were confirmed, with no order as to costs.