Patna HC Acquits Man In Rape Case, Finding Father’s Claimed Eyewitness Account Doubtful And Victim’s Testimony Materially Inconsistent

The appellant challenged his conviction under Sections 366-A and 376 IPC, arising from allegations that the informant’s minor daughter was taken away on 12 September 2010 and sexually assaulted.

She was recovered on 17 September and medically examined the following day.

The Sessions Court sentenced the appellant to four years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 366-A and five years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 376, to run concurrently.

On appeal, the High Court scrutinised the evidence of the victim, the informant-father, the medical witnesses and the investigating officer.

Under Section 366-A IPC, the prosecution must prove that the accused induced a minor girl to go from a place or do an act with the intent, or knowledge of likelihood, that she would be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person; the “another person” element is essential (Sat Parkash v. State of Haryana, (2015) 16 SCC 475).

A conviction may rest on a sole witness, including a prosecutrix, if the evidence is wholly reliable; where it is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable, the court must exercise caution and seek corroboration in material particulars (Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 614; Sunil Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367).

A prosecutrix’s testimony need not invariably be corroborated, but material contradictions may make reliance unsafe; medical evidence is corroborative and its absence does not, by itself, disprove rape (State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384; Nirmal Premkumar v. State, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 260).

The prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; suspicion, however grave, cannot replace proof (Santosh @ Bhure v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2023 INSC 443).

The Court found the father’s claim to have witnessed the taking away doubtful because it was an improvement, was inconsistent with the investigating officer’s evidence, and was accompanied by unexplained inaction and a two-day delay in lodging the report.

The victim’s evidence varied as to the persons who committed rape and the date and circumstances of the occurrence; her Section 164 CrPC statement was considered only to assess consistency, not as substantive evidence.

The medical evidence did not establish recent intercourse or independently connect the appellant to the alleged act, while the victim’s recovery alone did not prove his participation.

The Court therefore held that the prosecution evidence, taken cumulatively, did not prove the Section 376 charge beyond reasonable doubt.

Section 366-A also failed because there was no clear, trustworthy evidence that the appellant induced the victim for illicit intercourse with another person.

The bailors and sureties were discharged, any fine paid was ordered to be returned, and the trial court records were directed to be transmitted forthwith.