Patna HC Quashes Cheating And Cheque-Dishonour Prosecution Against Woman In Land Deal, Citing Section 142 NI Act Limitation Bar

The complainant, acting as a power-of-attorney holder, alleged that she entered into a registered agreement for sale of land with Sima Kumari. She alleged that two cheques issued by Sima Kumari—for ₹4,80,000 and ₹3,00,000—were dishonoured and that payment was not made after a legal notice.

The cheques were stated to have been issued on 9 January 2011, the bank memo was dated 6 November 2012, the legal notice was sent on 19 December 2012, and the complaint was filed on 19 June 2013.

The Magistrate took cognizance of offences under Section 420 IPC and Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“NI Act”), by order dated 12 August 2014. Sima Kumari sought quashing, principally alleging that the complaint was barred by Section 142(b) of the NI Act.

Section 138 of the NI Act creates an offence for cheque dishonour where its statutory conditions are met, including a written demand for payment and failure to pay within the prescribed period.

Section 142(b) requires a complaint under Section 138 to be made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises, subject to the court’s power to condone delay for sufficient cause.

The petitioner relied on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, concerning categories of cases in which criminal proceedings may be quashed, and Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751, in support of her submission that the facts did not disclose cheating.

She also cited Dr. Geetha v. Vasanthi S. Shetty, 2010 Cri LJ 2698.

The Court accepted the petitioner’s objection that the prosecution was subject to the statutory bar under Section 142 of the NI Act and concluded that continuation of the case would amount to an abuse of process.

Although the judgment records the dates of the bank memo, notice, and complaint, it does not state the date on which the notice was received, calculate the date on which the cause of action arose, or provide a detailed explanation of how the one-month period was exceeded.

Nor does it separately analyse whether the complaint’s allegations made out the ingredients of Section 420 IPC; its conclusion refers generally to the statutory bar and the authorities discussed.

It expressly left the proceedings against the co-accused free to continue.