01Facts
The Petitioner challenged a detention order dated 20 March 2026 (No. PSA-0326/C.R.-97/SPL-3(A)), passed by the Detaining Authority under s. 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act, 1988.
¶ 1 · p. 1The Grounds of Detention recorded seven prior offences, six involving Mephedrone, one involving Ganja, and one involving Ketamine and Charas.
¶ 4 · pp. 2–3Paragraphs 4 to 6 of the Grounds were expressly stated to be background only and not relied upon as grounds for detention.
¶ 3 · p. 2The sole "Relied Upon Case" was C.R. No. 87 of 2025 (ANC, Ghatkopar), under ss. 8(c), 22(b) and 29 NDPS Act, concerning an incident of 4 October 2025.
¶ 4 · pp. 2–3The Petitioner was already in judicial custody in C.R. No. 68 of 2025 (ANC, Ghatkopar), under ss. 8(c), 22(c) and 29 NDPS Act.
¶ 4 · p. 3The Petitioner was granted bail in C.R. No. 87/2025 on 6 February 2026 but remained in custody in C.R. No. 68/2025.
¶ 4 · p. 3The Grounds further noted bail in six cases and repeated violation of bail conditions.
¶ 5 · pp. 3–4Paragraph 9 of the Grounds recorded the Detaining Authority's subjective satisfaction, including a reference to "the possibility of you being granted bail".
¶ 6 · pp. 4–5The Petitioner pressed a single ground: the Detaining Authority did not record satisfaction, based on cogent material, of an imminent possibility of his release on bail.
¶ 7 · p. 5The Respondents opposed, relying on the Petitioner's long criminal record and prior preventive actions.
¶ 8 · pp. 5–602Issues
i.1. Whether a detention order against a person already in judicial custody is sustainable where the Detaining Authority has not recorded satisfaction, based on cogent material, of a real possibility of his release on bail.
¶ 7 · p. 5 · ¶ 12 · pp. 10–11ii.2. Whether the vague reference to "the possibility of you being granted bail" in para. 9 of the Grounds satisfies that requirement, given that the Grounds relied only on C.R. No. 87/2025, where bail had already been granted.
¶ 13 · pp. 10–12 · ¶ 14 · p. 1203Law Applied
Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act, 1988 is the source of the detention power.
¶ 6 · p. 5Preventive detention must be exercised sparingly, and where a person is in custody with no imminent possibility of release, it should not ordinarily be exercised; the authority must have cogent material, not an ipse dixit, supporting a likelihood of release on bail (Binod Singh v. District Magistrate, Dhanbad (1986) 4 SCC 416).
¶ 9 · pp. 6–7The likelihood of an application for bail is distinct from the likelihood of release on bail, and only the latter satisfies the requirement (Amritlal v. Union Govt. (2001) 1 SCC 341).
¶ 10 · pp. 7–8The authority must be aware of the detenu's custody, have reliable material showing a real possibility of release on bail, and find that upon release the detenu would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity (Mortuza Hussain Choudhary v. State of Nagaland, AIR 2025 SC 1685, citing Kamarunnissa v. Union of India, Union of India v. Paul Manickam and Union of India v. Dimple Happy Dhakad).
¶ 11 · pp. 9–10The principles require cogent material showing a reasonable likelihood of release, with past activities proximate in time justifying detention.
¶ 12 · pp. 10–11Provisions in the judgment · 4 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 Section 8Section 22Section 29
Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 Section 3
04Reasoning
The Court accepted that the Petitioner's past conduct indicated a likelihood of similar activity if released.
¶ 13 · p. 10The defect lay in the absence of cogent material showing a real possibility of his release on bail.
¶ 13 · p. 10Paragraph 9 contained only a vague reference to "the possibility of you being granted bail" and did not identify any material supporting that conclusion.
¶ 13 · p. 11The Grounds did not refer to the rejection of the Petitioner's bail application in C.R. No. 68/2025, the case in which he remained in custody.
¶ 13 · pp. 11–12The Detaining Authority expressly stated that it had considered only C.R. No. 87/2025, where bail had already been granted, so the basis for detention was not the likelihood of release in the custody case that was actually operative.
¶ 4, 13 · p. 3, 12The Court held that the satisfaction was an ipse dixit, contrary to Binod Singh, Amritlal and Mortuza Hussain Choudhary.
¶ 13 · pp. 11–12 · ¶ 14 · p. 12The Court did not consider the Respondents' submissions on criminal antecedents sufficient to cure this defect, as the Grounds expressly excluded the past record as a ground for detention.
¶ 3 · p. 2 · ¶ 8 · pp. 5–605Holding
The Detaining Authority did not record the requisite satisfaction, based on cogent material, that the Petitioner was likely to be released on bail in C.R. No. 68 of 2025, rendering the detention order unsustainable.
¶ 14 · p. 12The Rule was made absolute and the detention order dated 20 March 2026 was quashed and set aside, with a direction that the Petitioner be set at liberty if not required in any other case.
¶ 15(i) · pp. 12–13The Petitioner shall not be detained under the impugned order.
¶ 15(ii) · p. 13The order does not affect his custody in any other matter or offence.
¶ 15(iii) · p. 13The petition stands disposed of accordingly.
¶ 15(iv) · p. 13Original Court PDF
Sarfraz Sabir Ali Khan @ BhuravsState Of Maharashtra And Ors
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