01Facts
The Petitioner (TotalEnergies), as Service Provider, and H-Energy Gateway Pvt. Ltd. (now the Respondent, WCPL), as Terminal Owner, entered into a Binding Agreement for Regasification Services on 18 October 2017
¶ 2The agreement required an FSRU, the "Cape Ann," to operate at Jaigarh Port, and Section 14(a)(vi) of Exhibit A required the FSRU to carry or promptly make available the certificates, documents and equipment required by applicable law
¶ 2The rights of the original provider were later novated to the Petitioner
¶ 3A Conditions of Use Agreement (COU) between the port operator (JSW) and the vessel owner was needed for the vessel to enter the port. The parties could not agree on liability limits, and negotiations failed by April 2020
¶ 4The Respondent contended that the absence of the COU was a material breach of Section 14(a)(vi) and a repudiatory breach. The Petitioner disputed that the COU was a document required under Section 14(a)(vi)
¶ 5The vessel arrived on 15 March 2020 but could not enter the port. The Respondent terminated on 9 April 2020
¶ 6The Petitioner later drew on standby letters of credit and terminated on 30 June 2020
¶ 7The ICC arbitration was seated in London and governed by English law
¶ 8The Tribunal's Partial Award (14 April 2023) rejected a jurisdictional objection
¶ 9The Final Award (23 April 2025) upheld the Petitioner's termination and awarded substantial sums, including a USD 24.75 million termination fee and interest
¶ 9The Respondent did not challenge either award in England, and it did not pay
¶ 10The Petitioner filed for enforcement under Sections 47 and 49 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
¶ 1The Respondent resisted only on the ground that the Tribunal ignored its pleaded case of repudiatory breach, which it said rendered the award contrary to Indian public policy
¶ 16–23, 63(B)02Issues
i.1. Whether repudiatory breach was an issue the Tribunal was required to determine, given that it was pleaded in the Answer to the Request for Arbitration and the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, and mentioned in the opening submissions but not argued at the hearing
¶ 63(B)–(C), (D), (E), (F)ii.2. Whether the alleged repudiatory breach was distinct from the material breach under Section 14(a)(vi) that the Tribunal decided, or whether it stood or fell with that finding
¶ 63(B), (L), (M), (N), (O)iii.3. Whether the Tribunal's alleged omission meets the threshold for refusing enforcement under Section 48(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act as contrary to Indian public policy
¶ 63(P), (Q)03Law Applied
Section 48 of the Arbitration Act, whose grounds for refusing enforcement are exhaustive and must be construed narrowly. Enforcement courts may not review the merits of a foreign award
¶ 63(A)Under Section 48(2)(b), an award may be refused if it is contrary to public policy of India. The Court relied on Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi SRL (2020) 11 SCC 1 for the position that a failure to decide a material issue going to the root of the matter may shock the conscience, but that an inference of overlooked issues must be "clear and virtually inescapable," that an unpursued or inadequately pleaded plea may be treated as abandoned, and that an award must be read as a whole
¶ 63(I), (J), (N), 55The Court applied Daman Singh, Mohd. Akram Ansari and Common Cause on abandonment of pleaded but unargued issues
¶ 63(J)The Court referred to JVL Agro and BTN v. BTP on whether a pleaded issue remains "in play"
¶ 28, 63(F)Campos Brothers and I-Pay Clearing were relied on for the rule that a complete failure to decide a material issue may be fatal, but were distinguished
¶ 24–26, 63(Q)RAV Bahamas and World Trade Corporation were considered on whether the issue was "sufficiently clearly drawn" to the tribunal's attention
¶ 63(H)The Court considered English Arbitration Act provisions: Section 68(2)(d) (serious irregularity for failure to deal with all issues), Section 57(3)(b) (additional award), Section 70(3) (time limit) and Section 73 (loss of right to object)
¶ 29, 45–47, 63(C)(iv)–(v)The Court relied on Santa Sila Devi on silence in an award and on Torch Offshore on the scope of additional awards
¶ 55, 63(M)–(N)The Court considered Nagaraj v. Mylandhu and Government of India v. Vedanta on enforcement courts' independent jurisdiction and on the limits of issue estoppel
¶ 57–58, 63(A)Claude-Lila Parulekar and Eminence Property Developments set the test for repudiation, requiring a clear and unequivocal intention not to be bound
¶ 40–41, 63(O)Provisions in the judgment · 10 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 10 provisions
Section 44Section 47Section 48Section 49Section 34Section 57Section 58Section 68Section 70Section 7304Reasoning
On the first question, the Court held that the Tribunal was not required to decide repudiatory breach. The pleadings contained no particulars of the repudiatory breach beyond the COU issue; the Tribunal's issues referred only to material breach; the closing transcripts showed no repudiatory case being advanced; and the Respondent did not identify any argument on repudiation that was overlooked
¶ 63(C)–(E)The Court treated the Respondent's later reliance on the pleading as an afterthought. It found the plea was abandoned in substance, because the Respondent had not sought a specific issue and had dropped the other alleged breaches in its Statement of Defence
¶ 63(G), (K), (L)The Court distinguished JVL Agro and BTN on the ground that those cases involved issues argued and then dropped, whereas here the plea was never developed
¶ 63(F)On the second question, the Court held that repudiation rested on the same factual basis as material breach: the failure to conclude the COU. The Tribunal's finding that the COU was a contractual licence granted by JSW, to which the Petitioner was a stranger, disposed of any repudiation based on that obligation
¶ 63(M)The parties negotiated for over a month after the alleged repudiation, which was inconsistent with a clear and unequivocal renunciation
¶ 63(O)The Court held that Santa Sila Devi's exception did not apply, since there was no separate issue requiring specific adjudication
¶ 63(N)On the third question, the Court said it was strictly unnecessary to decide, but addressed it. It distinguished Campos Brothers (an arbitrator refused to consider submissions on a written-only record) and I-Pay (no finding on whether termination was lawful), because here there was a full oral hearing and the omitted issue was subsumed in the Tribunal's finding
¶ 63(Q)The Court held that the Respondent's proper remedies were under Section 57(3)(b) or Section 68(2)(d) of the English Act, and that its failure to use them weighed against it
¶ 63(C)(iv)–(v)05Holding
The Respondent failed to establish that the Final Award is contrary to the public policy of India under Section 48(2)(b). Repudiatory breach was not an issue the Tribunal was required to determine: it was not developed or pressed and was subsumed within the material breach finding
¶ 63(K), (M), (N), (Q)The Petition was allowed under prayer (a) of CAP No. 1110 of 2025, and the Final Award is to be enforced
¶ 63, Order (i)Interim Application No. 8094 of 2025 was disposed of as not surviving
Order (ii)There was no order as to costs
Order (iii)The Court stayed its operation for eight weeks on the Respondent's undertaking recorded in the order of 4 May 2026
¶ 65Original Court PDF
Totalenergies Gas And Power LimitedvsWestern Concessions Private Limited
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