Priority between registered deeds is determined by execution date, not registration date.

The plaintiff claimed title to 2½ cents of land through a conveyance executed by Pada on 19 July 1973 and registered in November 1973 (Ext. 1).

Pada had obtained a reconveyance from Provabati on 1 June 1973.

The defendants claimed under a later deed executed and registered on 24 October 1973, and alleged that the plaintiff’s deed was fraudulent.

The Trial Court dismissed the suit, and the First Appellate Court affirmed, rejecting the plaintiff’s claim and finding that she was not in possession.

The plaintiff appealed to the High Court in second appeal.

Whether the plaintiff acquired title under Ext. 1, executed before the defendants’ deed but registered later.

Whether the concurrent finding that the plaintiff was not in possession could be disturbed in second appeal, and whether the suit was barred by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act.

Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908 provides that, once registered, a document operates from the time it would have operated had registration not been required; accordingly, its operative date is ordinarily its date of execution, not registration.

Section 23 of the Registration Act allows a document to be presented for registration within four months of execution.

The Court relied on Gurbax Singh v. Kartar Singh, (2002) 2 SCC 611, for the principle that where competing documents are executed on different dates, the earlier-executed document prevails irrespective of the dates of registration.

The Court also noted that the First Appellate Court’s conclusion under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 was unsupported, as the plaintiff had sought declaration with consequential reliefs.

Ext. 1 was executed on 19 July 1973, after Pada had received the reconveyance on 1 June 1973, and thus when he had title to convey.

Under Section 47, registration within the statutory period made Ext. 1 operative from its execution date; it therefore preceded the defendants’ deed of 24 October 1973.

By then, Pada had divested himself of his interest, so the later deed conveyed no title.

The defendants’ allegation of fraud did not displace Ext. 1: the Court noted the absence of supporting evidence and of a counterclaim seeking to set it aside.

The Court declined to interfere with the concurrent factual finding that the plaintiff was not in possession.

It did not grant possession, leaving the plaintiff at liberty to bring appropriate proceedings for recovery of possession.

The second appeal was disposed of accordingly.