Rape-Murder Convict’s Two Life Terms Cannot Run Consecutively In A Single Trial, Supreme Court Says

The appellant was arrested on 30 April 2010 in connection with the rape and murder of a 12-year-old victim.

The Sessions Court convicted him under Sections 302 and 376 read with Section 342 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and imposed life sentences directed to run consecutively.

The Bombay High Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, including the direction for consecutive service.

The appellant separately challenged that direction before the Supreme Court; he also had a pending appeal concerning a writ petition seeking concurrent sentences.

Section 31(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), which generally permits sentences for multiple offences to run consecutively unless the court directs otherwise, must be interpreted consistently with the nature of a life sentence.

Under Muthuramalingam v. State, (2016) 8 SCC 313, a life sentence ordinarily requires imprisonment for the remainder of the offender’s life; therefore, multiple life sentences cannot be directed to run consecutively, including under Section 31 CrPC.

They may be imposed, but operate superimposed over one another, so remission or commutation of one does not automatically remit or commute the other.

Applying Muthuramalingam, the Court held that the life sentences imposed in this single trial could not be served consecutively: a person has one life, and a life sentence extends to its remainder unless lawfully remitted or commuted.

The consecutive-sentence direction was therefore legally unsustainable.

The sentences themselves remained in place, but were to be superimposed, preserving the independent effect of any remission or commutation granted in respect of either sentence.

It set aside the direction that the life sentences run consecutively and directed that they be superimposed; the remaining operative parts of the trial judgment, as affirmed by the High Court, were maintained.

The separate appeal arising from SLP (Crl.) No. 8535 of 2025 was disposed of as infructuous, and the Court expressly left undecided whether a writ court could order concurrent sentences.