Sarpanch With Three Children Stays In Office For Now As Supreme Court Refers Javed’s Two-Child Disqualification Ruling For Larger-Bench Reconsideration

The appellant was elected Sarpanch of Kakoda Gram Panchayat in 2022.

It was found that she had given birth to a third child in 2014, and her election was set aside on the ground that she was disqualified under Section 14(1)(j-1) of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959.

The Supreme Court’s inquiry focused on whether the rationale for laws disqualifying persons with more than two children remained sustainable in light of changed demographic circumstances and the precedent in Javed v. State of Haryana.

Section 14(1)(j-1) of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959 provides for disqualification from Panchayat membership on the basis of having more than two children.

In Javed v. State of Haryana, (2003) 8 SCC 369, the Court upheld a similar disqualification under Article 14, accepting population control as a legitimate legislative objective.

The Court considered the doctrine of temporal reasonableness: legislation that was reasonable when enacted may become arbitrary or unreasonable when the circumstances supporting its rationale materially change, as recognised in Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India and State of Maharashtra v. Super Max International (P) Ltd.

It also considered Article 21 protections for reproductive autonomy, including the right to decide whether and when to have children, and the principles of political participation and substantive equality.

The Court reasoned that the demographic premise underlying Javed had materially changed: India’s Total Fertility Rate had fallen from approximately 3.0 to 1.9, below replacement level, while population ageing was increasing.

It considered that the disqualification may exclude citizens from political representation without a sufficient connection to their capacity to hold office, disproportionately affect women in a patriarchal setting, and burden reproductive autonomy by forcing a choice between having a child and participating in local governance.

Although the statute’s validity was not directly challenged and the Court did not adjudicate it, the changed circumstances justified reconsidering the precedent that had upheld such restrictions.

The interim order permitting the appellant to continue as Sarpanch was continued until disposal of the Civil Appeal.