School Facilities Occupy Owner’s 0.15 Acre; Chhattisgarh HC Orders Equivalent Alternative Land Within 90 Days, After Obtaining His Consent

The petitioner was the recorded owner of 85 dismil of land at Gram Masturi. Approximately 0.15 acre of his land was used for facilities serving a government primary school.

In proceedings under Section 250 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959, the Tahsildar ordered restoration of the encroached portion. To avoid disrupting the school, the petitioner sought equivalent alternative government land. The Additional Collector rejected his request, reasoning that the petitioner’s father had consented to the construction. The petitioner challenged that decision, disputing the alleged consent and asserting that his father was not Sarpanch at the relevant time.

Section 250 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959, was the basis of the Tahsildar’s order directing restoration of possession of the encroached land.

The Court relied on Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2020) 2 SCC 569, for the principle that the State cannot deprive a person of property without lawful authority or sanction, and that alleged oral consent does not establish lawful authority to take property.

The Court also recognized the constitutional protection of property under Article 300-A, as raised in the petitioner’s submissions.

The Court treated the use of the petitioner’s land by the school and the Tahsildar’s restoration order as undisputed. The State produced no consent, agreement or other legally admissible material establishing that the petitioner’s father had voluntarily agreed to the use of the land.

The petitioner had also consistently pursued his grievance and sought alternative land rather than demolition of school facilities. In light of the rule against deprivation of property without lawful authority, the alleged consent could not bar appropriate redress; providing equivalent alternative land accommodated both the petitioner’s property claim and the school’s continued operation.

The respondent authorities were directed to pass the necessary orders within 90 days of receiving a copy of the order. The writ petition was disposed of accordingly.