01Facts
The plaintiff, Simrajit Singh, sued for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 23.04.2010 covering 62 kanals 12 marlas of land, with ₹28 lakh paid as earnest money and the sale deed due by 30.04.2010.
¶ 2He alleged that the defendant, Swaran Kaur, evaded execution despite repeated requests and registered notices, and that he remained present before the Joint Sub-Registrar on 18.11.2011 with the balance amount.
¶ 2The defendant denied executing the agreement, alleging it was procured by fraud through collusion with the vendor's legal heirs, a document writer and witnesses.
¶ 3The Trial Court framed seven issues, including whether the agreement was executed and whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform.
¶ 4It decreed the suit, and the First Appellate Court (Additional District Judge, Kaithal) affirmed by judgment dated 26.09.2018.
¶ 5The defendant filed this Regular Second Appeal.
¶ 6The Trial Court refused to examine the defendant's readiness-and-willingness objection because she had denied execution, but then held on evidence that readiness and willingness were established.
¶ 10.1, 10.2The defendant's memorandum of appeal specifically challenged that finding.
¶ 10.2, 10.3The First Appellate Court noticed the submissions but recorded no independent finding on it.
¶ 10.4, 1102Issues
i.1. Whether a defendant who denies execution of the agreement to sell is precluded from disputing the plaintiff's readiness and willingness to perform.
¶ 10.1, 11.3ii.2. Whether the First Appellate Court's failure to adjudicate the specifically raised readiness-and-willingness ground renders its judgment incomplete and unsustainable.
¶ 10.2, 11, 11.4iii.3. Whether the matter should be remanded to the First Appellate Court for fresh adjudication of that ground.
¶ 11.503Law Applied
The Court treated the appeal as one under Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, not Section 100 CPC, relying on Pankajakshi (Dead) v. Chandrika, (2016) 6 SCC 157, Kirodi v. Ram Parkash, (2019) 11 SCC 317, and Satender v. Saroj, 2022 (12) Scale 92, so no substantial question of law needed framing.
¶ 7Under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the plaintiff must establish continuous readiness and willingness, and the Court must examine this independently.
¶ 11.1Any defendant may raise the plaintiff's failure in this regard, not only the vendor or his legal representatives, as held in Ram Awadh (Dead) v. Achhaibar Dubey, (2000) 2 SCC 428.
¶ 11.1Readiness concerns capacity to perform, while willingness is shown by conduct and intention, and the plaintiff's financial capacity and conduct must be examined, as stated in U.N. Krishnamurthy v. A.M. Krishnamurthy, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 588.
¶ 11.2The Trial Court's reliance on Lal Chand v. Tek Chand, 2012 (4) CCC 239 (P), was noted as the basis for its contrary view.
¶ 10.2The First Appellate Court, as the final court of fact, must record reasoned findings on specifically raised grounds.
¶ 11.4Provisions in the judgment · 3 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 100
General Clauses Act, 1897 Section 27
Specific Relief Act, 1963 Section 16
04Reasoning
The Court held that the Trial Court's approach was legally erroneous. Denial of execution does not by itself bar a defendant from challenging readiness and willingness, because that is a statutory requirement the Court must examine independently.
¶ 11.3The Court then found the First Appellate Court's judgment incomplete. The appellant had expressly raised the readiness-and-willingness ground in her memorandum of appeal, and the plaintiff's entitlement to specific performance depends on it, yet the First Appellate Court recorded no finding.
¶ 10.3, 10.4, 11Because the Court is reluctant to decide the merits without the first appellate court's findings, it refrained from expressing any opinion on the rival contentions.
¶ 11.4The Court's own reasoning does not resolve the trial record. It noted, without deciding, the Trial Court's observation that the plaintiff had failed to prove his presence on 18.11.2011 (quoting para. 62 of the Trial Court judgment).
¶ 10.2It also noted an inconsistency in the dates of the legal notices, which the Trial Court placed at 14.05.2011 and which the pleadings place at 14.05.2010.
¶ 8.1, 10.2The appellant's other challenges, including fraud, execution, privity of contract, delay, and the cited authorities (Hansraj v. Parvati, 2018 (2) PLR 357; Harbans Singh v. Ram Singh, 2006 (1) PLR 569), were not decided.
¶ 8.2, 9, 11.505Holding
The Court answered Issue 1 in the negative: a defendant's denial of the agreement does not absolve the plaintiff of proving readiness and willingness.
¶ 11.3On Issue 2, the First Appellate Court's failure to decide the specifically raised ground renders its judgment incomplete on a central aspect.
¶ 11.4On Issue 3, the Court set aside the First Appellate Court's judgment and decree dated 26.09.2018 and remanded the appeal for fresh decision. The First Appellate Court must determine whether the plaintiff established continuous readiness and willingness, and should decide the appeal preferably within three months of receiving a certified copy of the order.
¶ 11.5All merits questions are left open, and pending miscellaneous applications stand disposed of. The Court did not decide whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance.
¶ 11.5, 12Original Court PDF
Swaran KaurvsSimarjit Singh
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