Three NDPS Accused To Get Bail As SC Says 24-Hour Clock Starts When Liberty Is Curtailed, Not At Formal Arrest

The appellants were charged under Sections 21(C), 22(C), 23(C), 25, 25A, 28 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), following the recovery of 60.79 kg of methamphetamine tablets from a truck and associated bags.

The search team intercepted the appellants at about 2:00 p.m. on 29 September 2025. The search and seizure concluded at about 5:00 p.m. that day, but the appellants were formally shown as arrested the following day at 11:00 a.m. and 11:15 a.m. They were produced before a Magistrate at about 4:45 p.m. on 30 September 2025.

The Special Judge rejected their bail applications, and the High Court dismissed their appeals, relying on the restrictions in Section 37 of the NDPS Act.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellants contended that the 24-hour period under Article 22(2) began when they were intercepted and their liberty curtailed, not when their arrests were formally recorded.

Article 22(2) of the Constitution requires every person arrested and detained in custody to be produced before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours, excluding only the time necessary for the journey to court; detention beyond that period requires a Magistrate’s authority.

Section 58 of the BNSS, corresponding to Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), additionally requires detention without warrant to be no longer than reasonable in the circumstances and, absent a Magistrate’s order, not to exceed 24 hours.

The Court held that, for Article 22(2), the period begins when a person is detained and their liberty is effectively curtailed—not when the authorities formally record an arrest. No investigative or statutory procedure creates a “buffer zone” that suspends the constitutional time limit.

Relying on Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote, the Court rejected attempts to distinguish informal custody from arrest where an authority has taken control of a person.

It also relied on Khatri v. State of Bihar and D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal on the strict observance of the production requirement and its role in preventing custodial abuse.

The decisions in Aryaman Pattnayak, Kannan and Arun K. Thomas, which treated search or investigative detention as distinct from arrest for this purpose, were held not to state the correct law.

The respondent’s own account established that the appellants were intercepted at 2:00 p.m. on 29 September 2025 and remained under the search team’s control while the search, testing and seizure were carried out.

Their liberty was therefore curtailed from that time; the subsequent formal arrest at 11:00 a.m. and 11:15 a.m. on 30 September could not reset the constitutional clock.

The time taken to complete NDPS Act procedures did not qualify for exclusion, as Article 22(2) permits exclusion only for the journey to court.

Since the appellants were produced at about 4:45 p.m. on 30 September—more than 24 hours after interception—their production was late.

Further, the respondent gave no explanation for the approximately 18-hour interval between the conclusion of the seizure at 5:00 p.m. on 29 September and the formal arrests the next morning; the Court held that this exceeded a reasonable period under Section 58 BNSS.

It directed that the appellants be produced before the jurisdictional Special Court within a maximum of seven days and thereafter released on bail on appropriate terms and conditions.

The Court also directed circulation of the judgment to State and Union Territory police chiefs, High Court Registrars-General and Directors of State Judicial Academies.