Allahabad HC Sends Juvenile Accused In Section 467 Case Back To JJ Board, Bars Adult Trial As Charge Is Not Heinous

The revisionist was charged under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC in a case concerning alleged fraud.

The Juvenile Justice Board (JJB) determined that he was 16 years, 9 months and 7 days old at the time of the alleged offence and, following a preliminary assessment, ordered that he be tried as an adult and transferred the matter to the Children’s Court.

After the record was returned to the JJB, it held that the offence was serious, not heinous; however, in 2026 it rejected the revisionist’s application to proceed before the JJB, reasoning that its earlier transfer order remained binding.

The Children’s Court dismissed the ensuing appeal, and the revisionist brought this revision.

Sections 2(33), 2(45) and 2(54) of the JJ Act classify offences as heinous, petty and serious, respectively; under Section 2(33), an offence is heinous only where the law prescribes a minimum punishment of at least seven years.

In Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 2 SCC 787, the Supreme Court held that offences carrying a maximum sentence exceeding seven years but no minimum sentence of seven years must be treated as serious offences until Parliament provides otherwise.

Under Sections 8(1), 9(2), 14, 15 and 18(1), (3) of the JJ Act, the JJB has jurisdiction over proceedings concerning children in conflict with law, while a transfer for trial as an adult under Section 18(3) follows a Section 15 preliminary assessment in a heinous-offence case.

Section 19(1) requires the Children’s Court, upon receiving a preliminary assessment, to decide whether an adult trial is necessary and, if not, to conduct the inquiry as a Board.

The Court also relied on the principles concerning limited procedural recall of criminal orders and absence of inherent jurisdiction, including those stated in Vikram Bakshi v. R.P. Khosla, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1783.

Section 467 IPC permits imprisonment for life or imprisonment up to ten years but prescribes no minimum sentence. Applying Shilpa Mittal, the Court held that the charge was therefore a serious, not heinous, offence.

Since Sections 15 and 18(3) did not authorize a preliminary assessment and transfer for trial as an adult in a serious-offence case, the JJB’s transfer order lacked subject-matter jurisdiction; the bar on substantive review could not justify retaining a case before a forum lacking statutory authority.

The Children’s Court also had to apply Section 19 and could not affirm adult-trial jurisdiction over a non-heinous offence.

It allowed the revision, quashed the JJB’s order dated 11 May 2026 and the Children’s Court’s order dated 16 July 2026, and remanded the matter to the JJB, Bulandshahr, for inquiry under Section 14 read with Section 18(1) of the JJ Act, without an adult trial.