Buyer’s Sale-Deed Suit Not Time-Barred At Threshold, Calcutta HC Says, As Pleadings Place First Refusal In Heirs’ 2026 Reply

The appellant sued for specific performance of an agreement dated 15 December 2022, under which she was to pay the balance consideration within six months and the vendor was to execute a registered sale deed; the agreement specified no deadline for execution of the deed.

The plaint alleged that the vendor repeatedly sought more time, but did not deny the agreement or refuse performance during his lifetime.

After his death on 27 September 2025, the appellant alleged that his heirs obstructed her and, in reply to a legal notice, refused performance on 13 July 2026.

The Trial Court rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) as time-barred, treating expiry of the six-month payment period as the starting point for limitation.

The appellant appealed.

Order VII Rule 11 CPC permits rejection of a plaint where, on its own averments, it is barred by law; however, limitation ordinarily presents a mixed question of fact and law and is not generally determined at the threshold where the plaint does not establish the bar.

Under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, limitation for specific performance runs from the date fixed for performance, or, where no such date is fixed, from when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.

Ahmadsahab Abdul Mulla (2) (Dead) by Proposed LRs v. Bibijan, (2009) 5 SCC 462, explains that the “date fixed for performance” and the date of notice of refusal are specific dates.

The Court distinguished N. Asha Devi v. R. Aravind Kumar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1718, Fatehji & Company v. L.M. Nagpal, (2015) 8 SCC 390, and Usha Devi v. Ram Kumar Singh, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1915, on their facts.

The plaint alleged that the vendor repeatedly sought postponement but never denied the agreement or refused to perform; it pleaded that the heirs first clearly refused performance in their reply dated 13 July 2026.

On those pleaded facts, the Court held that the cause of action for specific performance arose, at the earliest, upon that refusal, and that the suit filed in 2026 could not be held time-barred on the plaint alone.

The six-month period governed the appellant’s obligation to tender the balance consideration, not the vendor’s obligation to execute the sale deed; the agreement fixed no date for execution and registration.

Accordingly, the Trial Court could not treat expiry of that payment period as conclusively starting limitation, and the plaint did not disclose an apparent limitation bar warranting rejection under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

The connected application was disposed of, with no order as to costs.

The Court clarified that its observations were tentative and that the Trial Court remained free to decide limitation and all other issues on their merits, uninfluenced by the appellate observations.