Jharkhand HC Upholds Dismissal Of Husband’s Divorce Plea: RINPAS Board Found No Psychiatric Illness, Cruelty Unproved

The parties married on 31 January 2016 and had a son.

The husband sought dissolution under Sections 13(1)(ia) and 13(1)(iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, alleging cruelty and that his wife suffered from a mental disorder, including schizophrenia, which had been concealed before marriage.

The wife denied the allegations, asserted that she had been subjected to dowry-related cruelty, and stated that she was willing to resume cohabitation.

The Family Court dismissed the petition after considering the parties’ evidence and a RINPAS Medical Board report finding no psychiatric illness.

The husband appealed under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984.

Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act permits divorce for cruelty, assessed in light of the parties’ circumstances and the nature, gravity, and effect of the conduct; ordinary marital discord or trivial irritations do not suffice (Dastane v. Dastane; Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi; Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar).

Under Section 13(1)(iii), the petitioner must establish either incurable unsoundness of mind or a mental disorder of such a kind and extent that cohabitation cannot reasonably be expected; the mere existence of a mental abnormality is insufficient (Kollam Chandra Sekhar v. Kollam Padma Latha).

Expert opinion is relevant under Section 45 of the Evidence Act, 1872, but its weight is for the court to assess, and the expert’s credibility may be tested.

An appellate finding is perverse where it ignores or excludes relevant evidence, relies on irrelevant material, or is irrational in light of the evidence (Arulvelu v. State).

The applicable civil standard of proof is preponderance of probabilities.

The Court found that the cruelty allegations were general and unsupported by specific, reliable evidence of grave conduct; the husband and his witnesses identified no particular instance of assault or other conduct establishing cruelty.

On mental disorder, the private psychological report and prescriptions did not establish incurability or a disorder of the statutory degree.

In contrast, the court-directed RINPAS Medical Board examined the wife and concluded that she did not appear to have a psychiatric illness.

The husband did not seek to cross-examine a Board member or otherwise effectively challenge that report.

The Family Court had considered the material evidence, and its findings were not perverse.

It dismissed the appeal and left undisturbed the judgment and decree dismissing the divorce petition; any pending interlocutory applications were also disposed of.