Wife’s 498A Case and Unproved Adultery Allegations Amounted to Cruelty: Jharkhand HC Upholds Judicial Separation, Rejecting Desertion as Premature

The parties married in 2007 and have two children.

The husband petitioned for judicial separation under Section 22 of the Divorce Act, 1869, alleging cruelty and desertion.

He relied on the wife’s 2019 complaint under Section 498A IPC, allegations of adultery against him, and the parties’ separation.

The wife denied the allegations and asserted that she had been subjected to dowry-related cruelty.

The Family Court granted judicial separation on both grounds.

The wife appealed under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984.

Section 22 of the Divorce Act, 1869 permits a decree of judicial separation on the ground of cruelty or desertion for two years or upwards; accordingly, the statutory two-year period must have elapsed when the petition is filed for desertion to support relief.

The Court noted that the 2001 amendment omitted the words “without reasonable cause” from the provision.

It also applied the principle that unsubstantiated allegations impugning a spouse’s character, and false criminal proceedings against the spouse’s parents, may constitute mental cruelty.

The judgment referred to Mangayakarasi v. M. Yuvaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 786, and Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, (2021) 2 JBCJ 60 (SC), in recounting the trial court’s reasoning on criminal allegations and harm to reputation.

The Court found that the pleaded and admitted separation began on 8 August 2019, while the petition was filed on 28 January 2021. The two-year period had therefore not elapsed when the petition was instituted, making the desertion ground premature.

The cruelty ground nevertheless succeeded: the FIR had named the husband’s mother, against whom the police found insufficient material to proceed, and the husband was later acquitted in the criminal case.

The Court treated these circumstances as corroborating the claim of false implication.

It also found that the wife’s allegations of adultery, which impugned the husband’s character, were not supported by convincing evidence.

Taken together, the allegations and proceedings constituted mental cruelty.

However, cruelty was established, independently entitling the husband to judicial separation under Section 22 of the Divorce Act.

The Court set aside the trial court’s finding on desertion but affirmed the decree for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty, and disposed of the appeal.