01Facts
On 28.10.2014 at about 12.45 p.m., the petitioner, an MTC driver, was driving bus No. TN-01-N-8362 (route 32A) near the Mint Clock Tower Junction, Washermanpet. The bus struck an 80-year-old woman, who was crossing the road, and ran over her; she died at the spot.
¶ 2The complaint of P.W.1, an auto-rickshaw driver, led to FIR No. 264/H1/2014 under Section 304-A IPC and Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
¶ 2The prosecution examined P.W.1 to P.W.8 and marked Exs. P1 to P10. The defence examined no witnesses.
¶ 3The III Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Chennai, convicted the petitioner in C.C. No. 3690 of 2014 (09.12.2015). He was sentenced to one year R.I. and a fine of Rs. 5,000 under Section 304-A IPC, and to a fine of Rs. 1,000 under Section 184 M.V. Act.
¶ 1, 3The IV Additional City Civil and Sessions Court, Chennai, dismissed the appeal in C.A. No. 7 of 2016 (08.10.2021) but reduced the Section 304-A sentence to six months R.I.
¶ 1, 3The petitioner filed this revision under Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C.
The post-mortem (P.W.5) established the cause of death, and the Motor Vehicle Inspector (P.W.7) found no mechanical defect.
¶ 9, 1202Issues
i.1. Whether the High Court, in revision under Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C., may interfere with concurrent findings of fact on the evidence.
¶ 7ii.2. Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner drove the bus rashly or negligently, such that the death was its direct and proximate cause under Section 304-A IPC.
¶ 8, 10–18iii.3. Whether the conviction under Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act can be sustained.
¶ 1903Law Applied
Revisional jurisdiction is ordinarily limited and does not permit re-appreciation of evidence, but the High Court must interfere where findings are perverse, based on no evidence, a misreading of material evidence, or an inference the evidence does not permit, citing State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452, and Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460.
¶ 7Under Section 304-A IPC, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused's rash or negligent act was the direct, proximate and efficient cause of death. Criminal rashness involves hazarding a dangerous act with knowledge of the danger, and criminal negligence involves a gross failure to take reasonable care, citing Bhalchandra v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 1319, and Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, (2005) 6 SCC 1.
¶ 8Res ipsa loquitur does not apply in criminal trials, and speed is not conclusive of rashness; rashness must be judged by the nature of the road and traffic, citing Ravi Kapur v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 9 SCC 284.
¶ 8Section 184 M.V. Act requires that the vehicle was driven at a speed or in a manner dangerous to the public, judged by the nature, condition and use of the place and the traffic present.
¶ 8, 19A driver's general duty of care does not relieve the prosecution of proving a breach of that duty.
¶ 18Provisions in the judgment · 5 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 397Section 401Section 207Section 313
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 Section 184
04Reasoning
The Court found the undisputed facts (identity of deceased, death, and cause of death) insufficient to establish the manner of driving.
¶ 9The Court scrutinised the eyewitness evidence and found it unreliable. P.W.1 and P.W.3 did not see the driver, and P.W.2's presence at the spot was not documented. The three witnesses gave inconsistent accounts of the deceased's position (standing versus crossing), of whether the bus stopped, and of the time of occurrence.
¶ 10–14The only evidence of manner of driving was P.W.1's word "speedily," with no evidence of speed, distance, horn, or braking. The witnesses' own admissions described a narrow, blind curve on a busy road with heavy pedestrian and vehicular traffic, where high speed was unlikely.
¶ 15–16The trial court's reasoning, that the bus should have stopped immediately after impact, was held to be a non sequitur and an impermissible application of res ipsa loquitur. A heavy bus cannot stop instantly, and the post-impact conduct was not charged as an offence.
¶ 17The trial court also treated the death itself as proof of the offence and ignored the admissions regarding the place.
¶ 18Because the Section 184 conviction rested on the same inference, it fell with the Section 304-A finding. The Court held that the concurrent findings were perverse and inferred from no proven rashness, so revisional interference was justified.
¶ 19–2005Holding
The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner's rash or negligent driving caused the death, and the conviction under Section 184 M.V. Act could not stand.
¶ 19–20The Criminal Revision Case is allowed. The judgments of the IV Additional City Civil and Sessions Court dated 08.10.2021 (C.A. No. 7 of 2016) and of the III Metropolitan Magistrate dated 09.12.2015 (C.C. No. 3690 of 2014) are set aside. The petitioner is acquitted of the charges under Section 304-A IPC and Section 184 M.V. Act. Any fine paid is to be refunded, and any bail bond stands cancelled.
¶ 21Original Court PDF
K.ASHOKANvsTHE STATE REP BY
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