01Facts
The plaintiff and the appellants were siblings. Their father, Alagarsamy, received the suit properties under a registered partition deed (Ex.A1), which the Court construed as granting him only a life interest, without a right to encumber the properties.
pp. 2–5He later executed a registered settlement deed (Ex.A2) in favour of the plaintiff, who claimed possession and sought a permanent injunction against her brothers’ alleged interference. The defendants disputed her title and possession.
pp. 2–5The trial Court decreed the suit, and the first appellate Court affirmed that decree. The defendants appealed, challenging the effect of Ex.A1 and the alleged cancellation of a deed.
pp. 2–502Issues
i.1. Whether the Courts below were right to grant an injunction in reliance on Ex.A2 when Ex.A1 restricted Alagarsamy’s rights and prohibited alienation.
p. 5ii.2. Whether the injunction could stand in light of the asserted cancellation of a deed under Ex.B2. The second substantial question framed the cancellation as relating to Ex.A2; the judgment’s discussion, however, describes Ex.B2 as cancelling the release deed, Ex.A3.
p. 5 · ¶ 10 · p. 903Law Applied
Under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Second Appeal concerns substantial questions of law.
¶ 7–9, 14, 17–18 · pp. 7–8, 11–13A person in settled possession of immovable property, even without title, may protect that possession against unlawful interference and cannot be dispossessed except by due process of law.
¶ 7–9, 14, 17–18 · pp. 7–8, 11–13A transferor cannot convey a greater interest than the interest held; thus, a life-interest holder cannot convey absolute title beyond that limited interest.
¶ 7–9, 14, 17–18 · pp. 7–8, 11–13In a suit for bare injunction, possession is a distinct question from title, and established possession may support injunctive relief without finally determining competing claims of title.
¶ 7–9, 14, 17–18 · pp. 7–8, 11–13The Court relied on R. Pannerselvam v. A. Subramanian and another, 2009 (3) CTC 493, and A. Subramanian and another v. R. Pannerselvam, 2021 (1) MLJ (Civil) 580, for the principles concerning protection of established possession.
¶ 7–9, 14, 17–18 · pp. 7–8, 11–13Provisions in the judgment · 1 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 100
04Reasoning
The Court construed Ex.A1 as conferring only a life interest on Alagarsamy and therefore held that Ex.A2 could not give the plaintiff absolute title.
¶ 7–9, 11–15, 18–20 · pp. 7–12, 13–14It nevertheless treated title and possession as separate questions.
¶ 7–9, 11–15, 18–20 · pp. 7–12, 13–14The trial Court had found that the plaintiff was in possession when the suit was filed and when the alleged interference occurred, and the first appellate Court had affirmed that finding. The defendants had not displaced those concurrent findings.
¶ 7–9, 11–15, 18–20 · pp. 7–12, 13–14Nor did the asserted cancellation, which the judgment discusses as relating to Ex.A3, establish that the defendants were in possession or could lawfully dispossess the plaintiff.
¶ 7–9, 11–15, 18–20 · pp. 7–12, 13–14The Court therefore held that the plaintiff’s established possession could be protected without finally resolving title.
¶ 7–9, 11–15, 18–20 · pp. 7–12, 13–1405Holding
The Court answered both substantial questions of law against the defendants and dismissed the Second Appeal, confirming the permanent-injunction decree.
¶ 20–21 · p. 14It left the rival title claims open and stated that the defendants could pursue appropriate proceedings for declaration of title and recovery of possession, if advised. There was no order as to costs.
¶ 20–21 · p. 14Original Court PDF
A.STALIN,vsV.KALAISELVI,
Click to open original judgment
Original judgment, available to read, download and summarize on LawLens.in
