Grandfather’s Will Gave Father Only A Life Interest, So His Sale Could Not Bind Grandson, Madras HC Upholds

Govindarajalu Naicker’s Will dated 20 April 1992 dealt with the ‘C’ Schedule property, referring to Gajendran and his children and providing that the house would devolve upon Janardhanam, Gajendran’s son, after Gajendran’s lifetime and after Janardhanam performed his sister’s marriage.

Gajendran later sold part of the property to the appellants, who claimed that he had received an absolute estate.

Janardhanam sued for, among other reliefs, a declaration that the sale deed was not binding on him and for possession.

The Trial Court held that Gajendran had only a life interest and that Janardhanam held the remainder; the First Appellate Court affirmed.

The purchasers’ second appeal challenged those concurrent findings.

Under Section 100 CPC, a second appeal lies only where a substantial question of law arises; concurrent factual findings are generally not disturbed, though interference may be warranted where material evidence is ignored, findings rest on no evidence, the law is incorrectly applied to proved facts, or the burden of proof is wrongly placed.

In construing a Will, the document must be read as a whole and the testator’s intention ascertained from its terms; the court should, where legally possible, give effect to all testamentary dispositions and avoid an interpretation that creates repugnancy (Ramachandra Shenoy v. Mrs. Hilda Brite, AIR 1964 SC 1323).

A subsequent disposition cannot ordinarily operate against an absolute estate already created by an earlier disposition (Sadaram Suryanarayana v. Kalla Surya Kantham, (2010) 13 SCC 147), but apparently absolute language may be read as creating a life interest where the Will, read as a whole, provides for a later interest in the same property.

The Court also relied on Boodireddy Chandraiah v. Arigela Laxmi, 2007 (1) SCALE 188, and Narendra Gopal Vidyarthi v. Rajat Vidyarthi, 2008 SCC OnLine SC 1790, on the scope of second-appeal review.

The Court treated the construction of the Will as a substantial question of law because resolving whether its recitals created an absolute or limited estate required applying legal principles of testamentary interpretation.

It distinguished Sadaram Suryanarayana on the basis that the Will there conferred an absolute estate, whereas this Will contained no clear grant of unrestricted ownership or power of alienation to Gajendran.

Read together, the reference to Gajendran and his children, the express direction that the property devolve upon Janardhanam after Gajendran’s lifetime and the sister’s marriage, and the Will’s broader scheme of life interests followed by remainder interests showed that Gajendran had only a life estate.

Consequently, his sale could not defeat Janardhanam’s remainder interest.

The related questions were also answered against the appellants; the second appeal was dismissed, and the judgments and decrees of the courts below were confirmed, with no order as to costs.