01Facts
The appellant was appointed Assistant Professor (General Medicine) at Shrimant Rajmata Vijaya Raje Scindia Medical College, Shivpuri, on 9 April 2018.
¶ 3Respondent No. 7 was appointed Assistant Professor on 21 January 2019. Both are now Associate Professors.
¶ 3The Medical Education Department circular dated 5 August 2023 provides that the senior-most Professor shall be appointed HOD for a maximum of two years.
¶ 3, 4Clause 3 disqualifies a candidate who has expressed unwillingness, faces a departmental enquiry or criminal case, has received an "adverse remark by Dean," or has been charge-sheeted by the State.
¶ 3, 4, 19, 39The appellant was HOD from 9 September 2024 for two years.
¶ 7On 17 August 2026, the Dean issued a warning to Respondent No. 7 for dereliction of duty in a case where a patient died after he did not attend to him and referred him without signature.
¶ 41On 11 September 2026, Dr. Ashutosh Chaurishi was appointed HOD; the appellant challenged this in W.P. No. 41057/2026.
¶ 5On 8 October 2026, Respondent No. 8 appointed Respondent No. 7 as HOD for two years.
¶ 5, 18The appellant's challenge (W.P. No. 43000/2026) was dismissed in limine by the Single Judge on 13 October 2026 without calling for a return.
¶ 1, 5, 6, 49Respondent No. 5 contended that Respondent No. 7 received only a current charge under the rotation policy and that the warning was not a punishment.
¶ 7Respondent No. 7 relied on State of Haryana v. S.M. Sharma and argued that no one has a right to a current charge.
¶ 8Respondent No. 7 did not challenge the Dean's warning.
¶ 1502Issues
i.1. Whether the writ appeal is devoid of merit in light of S.M. Sharma and the circular dated 5 August 2023.
¶ 17ii.2. Whether the order dated 8 October 2026 constitutes a fixed-term appointment or merely a current charge of the HOD post.
¶ 20-21, 24, 27iii.3. Whether a person who is otherwise disqualified can be granted current charge of a post, and whether a writ of quo warranto is maintainable against such an appointment.
¶ 28, 32, 34-36iv.4. Whether a Dean's "warning" constitutes an "adverse remark by Dean" under clause 3 of the circular, thereby disqualifying Respondent No. 7.
¶ 38-4703Law Applied
Fundamental Rule 49 permits a government servant to hold charge of an additional post as a temporary measure, with such charge continuing until the regular incumbent joins.
¶ 22-23Sadachari Singh Tomar v. Union of India (decided 28 April 2026) was distinguished, with the holding that where an appointment order contains no "until further orders" or equivalent condition, it is a fixed-term appointment and not a mere current charge.
¶ 25-26The limited judicial review standard from Deputy General Manager v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava applies, namely arbitrariness, mala fides, or stigmatic action without due process.
¶ 25The S.M. Sharma principle that no one has a right to a current duty charge is accepted but limited to cases of mere displacement, not eligibility.
¶ 29, 32Under Rajesh Awasthi v. Nand Lal Jaiswal and Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat, quo warranto lies where an appointment is contrary to statutory rules or the holder lacks eligibility, and locus standi is relaxed.
¶ 34-36The plain-meaning rule from Gurudevdatta VKSSS v. State of Maharashtra, State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh, and JSW Infrastructure v. Kakinada Seaports applies, under which no words in a document may be treated as superfluous and disjunctive conditions operate independently.
¶ 40, 43-46Provisions in the judgment · 2
M.P. Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 Section 2
UK Limitation Act, 1939 Section 22
04Reasoning
The order dated 8 October 2026 fixes a two-year term, with no "until further orders" or "till regular incumbent joins" condition, and therefore operates as a fixed-term appointment regardless of the label "charge."
¶ 20, 24, 26-27Even if the order were a current charge, S.M. Sharma addresses displacement, not eligibility, so the question of whether a disqualified person may hold charge remained open.
¶ 28, 32Because eligibility could be tested, quo warranto was maintainable, and the Single Judge's dismissal at the threshold was unwarranted.
¶ 36-37On clause 3, the conditions are disjunctive, so proof of any one ground suffices.
¶ 40The argument that "adverse remark" equates to "punishment" was rejected, as the drafters used "adverse remark" deliberately and did not use "punishment," so the clause must be given effect as written.
¶ 47The Dean's warning, which followed a finding of dereliction of duty resulting in a patient's death, is an adverse remark, and Respondent No. 7 never challenged it, so he was disqualified.
¶ 42, 48, 50Counsel conceded that a doctor's primary duty is timely and sincere treatment and that the warning was not a punishment but remained a remark.
¶ 14, 4205Holding
The Court held that "adverse remark by Dean" in clause 3 cannot be read as "punishment," that Respondent No. 7 was disqualified from holding the HOD post on a fixed term or current charge, and that the appointment was therefore unsustainable.
¶ 50The appeal is allowed and the Single Judge's order dated 13 October 2026 in W.P. No. 43000/2026 is set aside.
¶ 53The order dated 8 October 2026 is quashed, Respondent No. 7 must immediately cease functioning as HOD, and Respondents 5, 6, and 8 may pass fresh orders in accordance with law.
¶ 51Prayers (ii) (enquiry into financial irregularities) and (iii) (disclosure of the basis for the earlier charge) were not considered, as they constituted misjoinder of causes of action, and the appellant may pursue them in appropriate proceedings.
¶ 52No order as to costs.
¶ 54Original Court PDF
Dr. Preeti NigotiavsState Of Madhya Pradesh
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