01Facts
The petitioner was engaged as a Packing Helper on 17.09.2010 through respondent No.4, M/s Shri Krishna Manpower Services Pvt. Ltd., and deployed at the establishment of respondent Nos. 2 and 3.
¶ 2He claimed continuous service until 01.03.2013 at wages of Rs. 7,500 per month.
¶ 2He alleged that his services were terminated on 01.03.2013 without notice, enquiry, or retrenchment compensation, despite more than 240 days of service.
¶ 2Conciliation failed, and the dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Bathinda, as Reference No. 19 of 2018.
¶ 2The management pleaded that it supplied manpower to Nestle India Pvt. Ltd. and that, due to surplus manpower, 75 workers, including the petitioner, were transferred to M/s Lumex Industry Ltd., Rewari, by communication dated 01.03.2013, with a direction to join by 08.03.2013.
¶ 2It alleged that the petitioner did not join, so the matter was a transfer, not a termination.
¶ 2The Tribunal answered the reference against the workman by award dated 20.02.2025.
¶ 3The Tribunal relied on MW-1's evidence, the list of transferred workers (Ex. M-1), the transfer letter, the postal receipt, and the appointment letter (Ex. M-5), whose Clause 10 permitted transfer.
¶ 10–11MW-1 admitted in cross-examination that registered letters had been received back and that no newspaper publication followed.
¶ 12The petitioner's affidavit (Ex. WW-1/A) referred to a direction to report at Rewari, and he produced no document showing termination by respondent No.4.
¶ 1302Issues
i.1. Whether the petitioner's services stood terminated on 01.03.2013, or whether he was transferred to another place of deployment.
¶ 9ii.2. Whether the non-conclusive proof of service of the transfer communication renders the Tribunal's award perverse or vitiated.
¶ 12, 17iii.3. Whether non-compliance with Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 arises, given completion of 240 days of service.
¶ 14iv.4. Whether the High Court, under Articles 226/227, should interfere with the Tribunal's findings of fact.
¶ 15, 1803Law Applied
The Court applied the settled limits of supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution: the High Court does not act as an appellate court over Industrial Tribunal findings, and it interferes only where a finding is based on no evidence, is perverse, suffers from a patent error of law or jurisdiction, or ignores material evidence; a mere possibility of a different view is insufficient.
¶ 15 · see also para. 18Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 requires compliance (notice and retrenchment compensation) only where there is retrenchment, so its application depends on first establishing termination; completion of 240 days of service does not by itself establish retrenchment.
¶ 14A contractual transfer clause in the appointment letter is relevant to whether a transfer, rather than termination, occurred.
¶ 11No precedents are cited in the judgment.
Provisions in the judgment · 2
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 Section 2ASection 25F
04Reasoning
The Court treated the dispute as a question of fact: whether the 01.03.2013 communication effected a transfer or a termination.
¶ 9It accepted that actual service of the transfer letter was not conclusively established, because MW-1 admitted that registered letters were returned and no newspaper publication followed.
¶ 12It held, however, that this lapse did not vitiate the award, since the Tribunal weighed it together with the appointment letter's transfer clause, the list of 75 transferred workers, the postal material showing the petitioner's correct address, and the petitioner's own affidavit and cross-examination.
¶ 11–13, 16–17The petitioner produced no document showing termination by respondent No.4.
¶ 13, 16The Section 25-F argument fell away with the foundational finding, because retrenchment compliance arises only if there was a termination.
¶ 14Measured against the Article 226/227 standard, the Court found the findings to be a reasoned appreciation of evidence, not perverse or based on no evidence, and declined to substitute its own view.
¶ 17–1805Holding
The Tribunal reasonably found the 01.03.2013 communication to be a transfer rather than a termination, and the failure to conclusively prove service of that letter does not render the award perverse.
¶ 16–17Section 25-F compliance therefore did not arise.
¶ 14No ground for interference with the award dated 20.02.2025 was made out.
¶ 19The writ petition is dismissed, and pending miscellaneous applications, if any, are disposed of.
¶ 20–21Original Court PDF
Ranjeet SinghvsPresiding Officer Industrial Tribunal Bathinda Add Others
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