Punjab and Haryana High CourtEmployment and Labour LawAdministrative and Public Law

Non-service of a transfer letter does not vitiate a Tribunal's finding of transfer over termination, absent perversity.

Ranjeet Singhv.Presiding Officer Industrial Tribunal Bathinda Add Others

Non-service of a transfer letter does not vitiate a Tribunal's finding of transfer over termination, absent perversity.. Ranjeet Singh vs Presiding Officer Industrial Tribunal  Bathinda Add Others. Punjab and Haryana High Court. LawLens
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In brief

The question

1. Whether the petitioner's services stood terminated on 01.03.2013, or whether he was transferred to another place of deployment.

The court held

The Tribunal reasonably found the 01.03.2013 communication to be a transfer rather than a termination, and the failure to conclusively prove service of that letter does not render the award perverse.

It also directed

Section 25-F compliance therefore did not arise.

No ground for interference with the award dated 20.02.2025 was made out.

The writ petition is dismissed, and pending miscellaneous applications, if any, are disposed of.

01Facts

The petitioner was engaged as a Packing Helper on 17.09.2010 through respondent No.4, M/s Shri Krishna Manpower Services Pvt. Ltd., and deployed at the establishment of respondent Nos. 2 and 3.

¶ 2

He claimed continuous service until 01.03.2013 at wages of Rs. 7,500 per month.

¶ 2

He alleged that his services were terminated on 01.03.2013 without notice, enquiry, or retrenchment compensation, despite more than 240 days of service.

¶ 2

Conciliation failed, and the dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Bathinda, as Reference No. 19 of 2018.

¶ 2

The management pleaded that it supplied manpower to Nestle India Pvt. Ltd. and that, due to surplus manpower, 75 workers, including the petitioner, were transferred to M/s Lumex Industry Ltd., Rewari, by communication dated 01.03.2013, with a direction to join by 08.03.2013.

¶ 2

It alleged that the petitioner did not join, so the matter was a transfer, not a termination.

¶ 2

The Tribunal answered the reference against the workman by award dated 20.02.2025.

¶ 3

The Tribunal relied on MW-1's evidence, the list of transferred workers (Ex. M-1), the transfer letter, the postal receipt, and the appointment letter (Ex. M-5), whose Clause 10 permitted transfer.

¶ 10–11

MW-1 admitted in cross-examination that registered letters had been received back and that no newspaper publication followed.

¶ 12

The petitioner's affidavit (Ex. WW-1/A) referred to a direction to report at Rewari, and he produced no document showing termination by respondent No.4.

¶ 13

02Issues

i.1. Whether the petitioner's services stood terminated on 01.03.2013, or whether he was transferred to another place of deployment.

¶ 9

ii.2. Whether the non-conclusive proof of service of the transfer communication renders the Tribunal's award perverse or vitiated.

¶ 12, 17

iii.3. Whether non-compliance with Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 arises, given completion of 240 days of service.

¶ 14

iv.4. Whether the High Court, under Articles 226/227, should interfere with the Tribunal's findings of fact.

¶ 15, 18

03Law Applied

The Court applied the settled limits of supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution: the High Court does not act as an appellate court over Industrial Tribunal findings, and it interferes only where a finding is based on no evidence, is perverse, suffers from a patent error of law or jurisdiction, or ignores material evidence; a mere possibility of a different view is insufficient.

¶ 15 · see also para. 18

Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 requires compliance (notice and retrenchment compensation) only where there is retrenchment, so its application depends on first establishing termination; completion of 240 days of service does not by itself establish retrenchment.

¶ 14

A contractual transfer clause in the appointment letter is relevant to whether a transfer, rather than termination, occurred.

¶ 11

No precedents are cited in the judgment.

Provisions in the judgment · 2

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 Section 2ASection 25F

04Reasoning

The Court treated the dispute as a question of fact: whether the 01.03.2013 communication effected a transfer or a termination.

¶ 9

It accepted that actual service of the transfer letter was not conclusively established, because MW-1 admitted that registered letters were returned and no newspaper publication followed.

¶ 12

It held, however, that this lapse did not vitiate the award, since the Tribunal weighed it together with the appointment letter's transfer clause, the list of 75 transferred workers, the postal material showing the petitioner's correct address, and the petitioner's own affidavit and cross-examination.

¶ 11–13, 16–17

The petitioner produced no document showing termination by respondent No.4.

¶ 13, 16

The Section 25-F argument fell away with the foundational finding, because retrenchment compliance arises only if there was a termination.

¶ 14

Measured against the Article 226/227 standard, the Court found the findings to be a reasoned appreciation of evidence, not perverse or based on no evidence, and declined to substitute its own view.

¶ 17–18

05Holding

The Tribunal reasonably found the 01.03.2013 communication to be a transfer rather than a termination, and the failure to conclusively prove service of that letter does not render the award perverse.

¶ 16–17

Section 25-F compliance therefore did not arise.

¶ 14

No ground for interference with the award dated 20.02.2025 was made out.

¶ 19

The writ petition is dismissed, and pending miscellaneous applications, if any, are disposed of.

¶ 20–21
Punjab and Haryana High Court

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Ranjeet SinghvsPresiding Officer Industrial Tribunal Bathinda Add Others

Punjab and Haryana High Court · November 21, 2026

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