01Facts
Respondent No. 2 joined the petitioner-company as HR Head on 22.09.2014.
¶ 2Respondent No. 2 resigned by e-mail dated 02.04.2019, citing 60 days' notice under her appointment letter. The petitioner accepted the resignation the same day and fixed her relieving date as 30.04.2019, paying one month's salary in lieu of the unserved notice period.
¶ 2A service certificate and relieving letter were issued on 28.05.2019.
¶ 2Respondent No. 2 claimed that her service extended beyond 30.04.2019, that she completed 240 days in the fifth year, and sought gratuity.
¶ 2The Controlling Authority allowed the claim on 02.08.2021, directing payment of Rs. 2,88,462 as gratuity and Rs. 63,053 as interest, with further interest on default. It found that she had served until 28.05.2019, i.e., 4 years and 249 days, relying on RW-1's cross-examination admission that the notice period was 60 days and that she was to be relieved on 28.05.2019.
¶ 2 · ¶ 7The Appellate Authority dismissed the petitioner's appeal on 07.10.2022 (Annexure P-13), affirming the concurrent findings.
¶ 2 · ¶ 8The petitioner contends that respondent No. 2 served only 4 years and 216 days, relying on the relieving date and the discretion under Clause 8 of the appointment letter.
¶ 302Issues
i.1. Whether an employee who has rendered less than five years of actual service, but completed 240 days in the fifth year, can be deemed to have completed five years of continuous service for Section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 under Section 2-A(2), where cessation of employment is by resignation.
¶ 6ii.2. Whether the concurrent factual findings of the statutory authorities on the period of service can be interfered with in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227.
¶ 14 · ¶ 1603Law Applied
The Court applied Section 4(1) of the Gratuity Act, which makes gratuity payable on termination by resignation, superannuation, or retirement after five years of continuous service.
¶ 9The Court relied on Section 2-A, under which sub-section (1) defines uninterrupted service and sub-section (2) deems an employee to be in continuous service for one year where, in the preceding twelve calendar months, the employee has actually worked 240 days; the deeming fiction operates independently of the grounds in sub-section (1).
¶ 10The Court followed M/s Business Octane Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court-I, Gurgaon, CWP-16870-2016 (decided 17.11.2025), holding that sub-sections (1) and (2) operate in distinct spheres and that voluntary cessation does not bar the benefit of sub-section (2).
¶ 11The Court relied on Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, (1980) 4 SCC 443, explaining the parallel deeming provision in Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947: once 240 days of actual work in the preceding twelve months is proved, the statutory fiction of continuous service applies.
¶ 12The Court applied the settled principle that writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 is supervisory and does not permit re-appreciation of evidence, with interference limited to jurisdictional error, patent illegality, perversity, or breach of natural justice.
¶ 16Provisions in the judgment · 3
PAYMENT OF GRATUITY ACT, 1972 Section 2ASection 4
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 Section 25
04Reasoning
The Court first held that the bar on resignation does not exist under Section 2-A(2). Because the statutory fiction operates where the employee is not in continuous service under sub-section (1), the mere fact that employment ended by resignation cannot defeat its application.
¶ 10Applying Business Octane, the Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the benefit is unavailable on voluntary cessation.
¶ 11 · ¶ 12On the facts, the Court held that the Controlling Authority's finding of service up to 28.05.2019, based on RW-1's admission about the 60-day notice and the relieving date, established 249 days in the fifth year, crossing the 240-day threshold.
¶ 7 · ¶ 13The Court declined to treat the notice-pay payment as decisive. It found that the determination rested on the factual finding of the period of service, which the petitioner failed to show was recorded without evidence or on a misrecorded admission. Reliance on the earlier relieving date and an alternative reading of Clause 8 did not justify substituting the concurrent factual findings in writ jurisdiction.
¶ 14Once the factual foundation for Section 2-A(2) was established, the qualifying period was treated as continuous service for Section 4(1), so the lack of five full calendar years from joining did not disentitle the respondent.
¶ 15The Court found no perversity or jurisdictional error in either authority's concurrent findings.
¶ 1705Holding
The Court held that an employee who completes 240 days of actual work in the preceding twelve months is entitled to the deeming benefit of Section 2-A(2), even where employment ends by resignation, and may claim gratuity under Section 4(1).
¶ 10 · ¶ 11 · ¶ 12 · ¶ 15The concurrent findings that respondent No. 2 served until 28.05.2019 and completed 249 days in the fifth year were not shown to be perverse or jurisdictionally infirm, so interference under Articles 226/227 was not warranted.
¶ 14 · ¶ 17The writ petition was dismissed, and the orders dated 02.08.2021 (Controlling Authority) and 07.10.2022 (Appellate Authority) were upheld.
¶ 18Original Court PDF
M/S Tenon Facility Management India Pvt LtdvsThe Appellate Authority Under Graduity Act 1972 And Anr
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