01Facts
The petitioner was arrested in FIR No. 355 dated 17.12.2020 under Sections 302, 201, 120B IPC and 25/54/59 Arms Act, Police Station Safidon, District Jind.
¶ 2On 22.05.2025 the Additional Sessions Judge, Jind, convicted the petitioner and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs. 40,000/-.
¶ 3As of 02.11.2026 the petitioner had undergone 4 years, 5 months and 12 days of custody.
¶ 4The petitioner sought 10 weeks' regular parole under the Haryana Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 2022 ("the Act") on the ground that his aged mother needed care and he had family responsibilities.
¶ 5The application was forwarded from Karnal Jail to the Divisional Commissioner, Karnal, with a copy to the District Magistrate, Shamli (U.P.).
¶ 7 · reply ¶4The SP, Shamli, through a Station House Officer's inquiry, reported that the petitioner was a "high-profile criminal" likely to resume criminal activity and disturb public order, and the District Magistrate did not recommend release.
¶ 6 · reply ¶5On 28.10.2026 the Divisional Commissioner, Karnal, rejected the application by an endorsement relying on Section 8 of the Act.
¶ 6 · reply ¶6The petitioner challenged that order under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution seeking a mandamus for release.
¶ 1The State's reply is recorded at paras 4 to 6 of the status report.
¶ 702Issues
i.1. Whether the Divisional Commissioner's order dated 28.10.2026, which adopts the SP/DM report without disclosing independent consideration, objective material, or reasons for the apprehension of breach of peace, is sustainable in law under Section 8 of the Act.
¶ 8, 9, 10, 35ii.2. Whether the High Court may interfere with an administrative refusal of parole and, if so, on what limited grounds.
¶ 11, 29, 33, 3403Law Applied
Section 3 of the Act provides for regular parole of up to ten weeks per calendar year.
¶ 13Section 8 of the Act bars release where the competent authority, on the report of the DM, DCP or SP "or otherwise," is satisfied that release is likely to endanger State security, public order, or cause reasonable apprehension of breach of peace.
¶ 13Section 12(3), (4) and (7) of the Act require the Superintendent Jail to forward applications with reports and require a speaking order for any rejection.
¶ 13Sunil Fulchand Shah v. Union of India (2000) holds that parole is an administrative action that does not suspend the sentence.
¶ 30Smt. Poonam Lata v. M.L. Wadhawan (1987) defines parole as conditional partial liberty that does not change the prisoner's status.
¶ 31Maru Ram v. Union of India (1981) favours liberal parole subject to security safeguards.
¶ 32State of Gujarat v. Lal Singh (2016) holds that the constitutional court may interfere only where the request is unjustifiably refused or the interest of justice so warrants, should do so sparingly, and should leave conditions to the authorities.
¶ 33Home Secretary (Prisons) v. H. Nilofer Nisha (2020) holds that parole is a privilege, not a right, that courts cannot exercise the discretion but may quash orders not in accordance with rules.
¶ 34T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa (1955) holds that certiorari lies for manifest errors apparent on the face of the record or for failure to follow prescribed procedure.
¶ 12Provisions in the judgment · 6 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Indian Penal Code, 1860 Section 302Section 201
Arms Act, 1959 Section 25Section 54Section 59
Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 Section 12
04Reasoning
The impugned order merely recorded the SP's conclusion and did not show independent consideration of the report or its underlying material.
¶ 8The order identified no objective ground, supporting evidence, source of information, or associated person or group to justify the finding that the petitioner would indulge in criminal activity.
¶ 9The order did not explain why the conditions that could attach to parole would fail to address the apprehension of criminal activity.
¶ 10Because Section 8 requires the authority to be "satisfied" on the material before it, and because Section 12(7) requires a speaking order, a bare adoption of an unsupported inquiry report falls within the category of manifest, non-reasoned error that the Court may review.
¶ 11, 12, 35The Court framed its interference as limited under Lal Singh and Nilofer Nisha, and did not decide whether parole should be granted, leaving the merits to the competent authority.
¶ 33, 34, 37The Court did not examine whether the petitioner is a "hardcore convicted prisoner" under Section 2(1)(g) or Section 6 of the Act, and that question is not addressed in the judgment.
¶ 1305Holding
The order dated 28.10.2026 cannot sustain legal scrutiny because it is unreasoned and unsupported by material, and it is therefore set aside.
¶ 8, 9, 10, 35, 39The competent authority must consider the material on record and must not reject parole on "general statements, apprehensions, or undisclosed information."
¶ 36The writ petition is allowed and the matter is remanded to the Divisional Commissioner, Karnal Division, and the District Magistrate, Jind, to decide the application afresh by a reasoned order within 30 working days of receipt of the digital copy, to be communicated to the petitioner.
¶ 38, 39The Court expressly expressed no opinion on the merits of release, and liberty to re-approach the Court was reserved.
¶ 37Original Court PDF
Hariom Alias LuckyvsState Of Haryana And Others
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