01Facts
The petitioner was convicted by the Sessions Judge, Kurukshetra, on 18.02.2025 in FIR No. 76 dated 03.02.2021 (Sections 302, 120-B, 473, 34 IPC, and Section 25 Arms Act) and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs. 20,000/-.
¶ 2–3As of 02.11.2026 he had undergone 3 years, 4 months and 24 days of custody.
¶ 4He sought 10 weeks' regular parole under the Haryana Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 2022, citing the need to care for his elderly parents and family.
¶ 5The District Magistrate, Meerut, opposed release on the basis of an SSP (Crime) report dated 13.05.2026, which described the petitioner as a "high-profile criminal" likely to resume criminal activity and disturb public order.
¶ 6–7The Divisional Commissioner, Karnal, initially directed a fuller report, and after the District Magistrate reaffirmed opposition on 22.07.2026, rejected the application by order dated 07.08.2026.
¶ 7The petitioner challenged that order under Article 226 and sought certiorari and, alternatively, mandamus for release on parole.
¶ 102Issues
i.1. Whether the order dated 07.08.2026 rejecting parole is sustainable where it merely adopts the SSP's report and records conclusions without independent consideration, objective grounds, or supporting material.
¶ 8–10ii.2. Whether the scope of the High Court's interference in a parole refusal under Article 226 extends to quashing an order that is arbitrary, perverse, or based on irrelevant considerations.
¶ 11–12iii.3. Whether the appropriate relief is quashing and remand for a fresh, reasoned decision, or a direction to grant parole.
¶ 29, 33, 35–3903Law Applied
Section 3 of the Haryana Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 2022 authorises regular parole of up to ten weeks per calendar year, subject to the procedure in Sections 11 and 12, and makes eligibility subject to completion of one year's sentence.
¶ 13Section 8 bars release where the competent authority is satisfied that release would endanger State security, public order, or cause reasonable apprehension of breach of peace, based on the report of the District Magistrate, SSP/DCP, or otherwise.
¶ 13Section 12(3), (6) and (7) require the Superintendent Jail to forward the application, the District Magistrate to make a recommendation, and the competent authority to decide and, on rejection, pass a speaking order.
¶ 13Under T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, certiorari lies for manifest errors apparent on the face of the record or clear disregard of the governing provisions.
¶ 12Parole is a privilege, not a right, and is an administrative action.
¶ 14, 29, 30, 34Under Sunil Fulchand Shah v. Union of India, Poonam Lata v. M.L. Wadhawan and State of Gujarat v. Lal Singh, parole is administrative in character, the High Court's power under Article 226 is preserved but to be sparingly exercised, and the authorities should ordinarily be left to set conditions.
¶ 30, 31, 33Maru Ram v. Union of India was cited for the view that penal humanitarianism and rehabilitation warrant liberal parole subject to security safeguards.
¶ 32Under the H. Nilofer Nisha ruling, courts cannot exercise the parole power themselves, though they may hold that its exercise is not in accordance with the rules.
¶ 34Provisions in the judgment · 9 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Indian Penal Code, 1860 Section 302Section 473Section 34
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 Section 103Section 61Section 341Section 3
Arms Act, 1959 Section 25
Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 Section 12
04Reasoning
The impugned order, on its face, merely adopted the SSP's conclusion without showing independent consideration of the report or the material underlying it.
¶ 8The order identified no objective ground, supporting evidence, person, group, or source to substantiate the apprehension of future criminal activity or threat to public order, so those findings remained unsupported conclusions.
¶ 9The order also did not explain how the apprehended risk could not be addressed by the conditions on which parole may be granted.
¶ 10Applying Basappa, the Court treated this as a manifest defect on the face of the record and a failure to engage with the statutory framework under Sections 8 and 12(7), which require reasons where parole is rejected.
¶ 12, 13The Court did not examine the merits of release, consistent with the administrative nature of the power and the limits in Sunil Fulchand Shah and Lal Singh.
¶ 30, 33, 37The remedy was therefore confined to quashing the order and requiring fresh consideration on the material on record, with the decision not to rest on general statements, apprehensions, or undisclosed information.
¶ 3605Holding
The order dated 07.08.2026 cannot withstand legal scrutiny, as it rests on unsupported conclusions and lacks independent consideration and reasons.
¶ 35The writ petition was allowed and the order dated 07.08.2026 was set aside. The Divisional Commissioner, Karnal Division, was directed to decide the petitioner's parole application afresh within 30 working days of receiving the digital copy of the order, by a reasoned order, after considering the material on record and not relying on general statements, apprehensions, or undisclosed information. The Court expressed no opinion on whether parole should be granted, and liberty was reserved to the petitioner to approach the Court again if needed.
¶ 36, 37, 38, 39Original Court PDF
AmitvsState Of Haryana And Others
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