Rs 7,500 Trap: Madras HC Acquits Assistant Agricultural Officer, Finding Bribe Demand Unproved

The appellant, an Assistant Agricultural Officer, was convicted under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, for allegedly demanding and accepting ₹7,500 from a farmer in connection with a coconut-subsidy application.

The prosecution relied on the complainant’s account of prior demands, the trap proceedings and recovery of tainted currency.

The appellant admitted receiving the money but said it was payment for fertilizer.

The trial court convicted him and imposed concurrent three-year terms of rigorous imprisonment; he appealed under Section 374(2) CrPC.

Under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, proof of demand is essential; recovery or possession of money alone does not establish the offence.

Mukhtiar Singh v. State of Punjab, (2017) 8 SCC 136, and the Constitution Bench decision in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731, establish that demand and acceptance must be proved, directly or circumstantially, before the presumption under Section 20 may arise.

If raised, the Section 20 presumption may be rebutted on a preponderance of probabilities; it cannot substitute for proof of the foundational facts.

Under Section 19, sanction requires the competent authority’s application of mind to relevant material; State of Karnataka v. Ameerjan, (2007) 11 SCC 273, treats sanction as an important safeguard, not a formality.

A police statement under Section 162(1) CrPC is not substantive evidence or corroboration and may be used only in the manner permitted by that provision and Section 145 of the Evidence Act.

Confessions to police are inadmissible under Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act.

The Court found the sanction inadequately established: the DVAC report and the Commissioner’s letter referred to in the sanction order were not produced; the report did not mention the alleged initial demand; and the order recited a signal inconsistent with the witnesses’ accounts. These matters undermined proof of independent application of mind.

On demand, the alleged first demand was omitted from the complaint, and the subsequent telephone and in-person demands rested on the complainant’s uncorroborated testimony.

At the trap, the words attributed to the appellant—asking whether the complainant had brought the money—were consistent with the asserted fertilizer transaction and did not independently establish a bribe demand.

The trial court also erred by treating an unproved Section 161 statement as corroboration.

Although receipt and recovery were not seriously disputed, they did not prove illegal gratification in the absence of demand; accordingly, the Section 20 presumption could not be invoked. The fertilizer-payment explanation was possible on the evidence and raised reasonable doubt.

The presumption under Section 20 therefore did not arise, and the convictions under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) could not stand.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction and sentence set aside, and the appellant acquitted; any fine paid was ordered refunded and any bail bond cancelled.