01Facts
The appellants, a senior clerk and a head clerk of a private aided school run by respondent no. 4, were proceeded against departmentally with the in-charge headmaster for misappropriation of public money.
¶ 2The inquiry committee was reconstituted after objections, but the appellants boycotted the proceedings, which then continued ex parte.
¶ 2The committee held the charges established, but neither the minutes nor the final inquiry reports were furnished to the appellants before their termination.
¶ 2The School Tribunal stayed the termination orders and directed reinstatement with 50% salary.
¶ 3On the school's writ petitions, the High Court, by consent order dated 17 March 2005, quashed the interim order. It permitted the school to apply to lead evidence to prove the charges and directed the Tribunal to expedite disposal.
¶ 4The school never led evidence.
¶ 5The Tribunal, by final orders dated 19 July 2006, dismissed the appeals, relying on the appellants' non-participation and on documentary material, although no finding on misappropriation had been recorded.
¶ 5The appellants' writ petitions under Article 226 were dismissed by a Single Judge, who held that they were not similarly placed with the in-charge headmaster.
¶ 6–802Issues
i.1. Whether the Supreme Court may grant relief under Article 226 and the merits of the Tribunal's order may be examined where the writ petitions did not plead those grounds.
¶ 9ii.2. Whether the school's failure to comply with the High Court's consent order of 17 March 2005, and its failure to lead evidence, vitiates the findings of misconduct and the termination.
¶ 10–11iii.3. Whether the non-supply of the final inquiry reports before termination constitutes a serious procedural flaw that invalidates the disciplinary action.
¶ 11iv.4. Whether an order wholly contrary to an express judicial order is a nullity, and whether relief under Article 142 is warranted despite defective pleadings.
¶ 11–1203Law Applied
A party must plead the averments supporting its claim, and a court need not entertain unpleaded grounds.
¶ 9A High Court cannot grant relief under Article 226 to a litigant who has not pleaded an appropriate case.
¶ 11An action or order wholly contrary to an express judicial order passed by a competent authority is a nullity and cannot be accepted, relying on Ram Saran Varshney v. State of U.P., (2016) 3 SCC 724.
¶ 11, n.14The tribunal relied on Ranjan Kumar Mitra v. Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd., (1997) 10 SCC 386, and Rule 37(2)(a)(iii) of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981, concerning documents relied upon in an inquiry.
¶ 5The Court may invoke its power under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice where a party is not entitled to full relief on its pleadings.
¶ 12Provisions in the judgment · 1 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977. Section 9
04Reasoning
The appellants' challenge to the merits of the Tribunal's final orders was beyond their pleadings, and the Single Judge could not be faulted for not addressing the school's omission to lead evidence.
¶ 9The school's non-compliance with the consent order was unexplained and a matter of serious concern.
¶ 10Because the school never led evidence, there was no evidence worth the name supporting the charges, so they could not be held "established."
¶ 11The Tribunal's holding that the inquiry suffered no infirmity was untenable given that the final inquiry reports were never furnished before termination, a serious procedural flaw.
¶ 11Applying the principle in Ram Saran Varshney that an order contrary to an express judicial order is a nullity, the appellants merited some relief despite defective writ pleadings.
¶ 11Since larger relief could no longer be granted ex debito justitiae because of the drafting failures and the death of Prithviraj S. Singh, the Court used Article 142 to award compensation instead of reinstatement.
¶ 1205Holding
The writ petitions were defectively drafted and the merits of the Tribunal's orders were not properly before the Court.
¶ 9The school's failure to comply with the consent order of 17 March 2005 and its failure to lead evidence left no evidence supporting the charges, and non-supply of the final inquiry reports was a serious flaw.
¶ 10–11The appeals were disposed of by directing the school to pay each appellant ₹10,00,000 as lump-sum compensation for wrongful termination within three months, to the heirs of the deceased Prithviraj S. Singh and to Shivadatta R. Singh, as full and final settlement of all dues. Default attracts 12% per annum interest until payment.
¶ 12Connected applications stand disposed of.
¶ 14Original Court PDF
Prithviraj S. Singh (Deceased) Through Lrs Etc.vsThe Secretary, School Education Department, State Of Maharashtra
Click to open original judgment
Original judgment, available to read, download and summarize on LawLens.in
