Wife’s Withdrawal From Notarised Mutual-Divorce Agreement Alone Not Cruelty, Chhattisgarh HC Upholds Dismissal Of Husband’s Divorce Plea

The parties married on 29 June 2012 and have two daughters.

The husband alleged that the wife quarrelled with him and his family, pressured him to live separately from his parents, and threatened him with false criminal cases.

He relied on, among other things, a notarised agreement recording an intention to live separately and pursue divorce by mutual consent, and a rent agreement.

The wife did not appear or file a written statement in the Family Court.

The Family Court dismissed the husband’s petition for divorce under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, finding that cruelty had not been proved.

The husband appealed under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984.

The High Court noted that the divorce petition was filed on 23 September 2024, five days after execution of the rent agreement.

Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 permits divorce on the ground of cruelty, which must be proved by the party seeking dissolution on a preponderance of probabilities; general or unsubstantiated allegations are insufficient.

Cruelty is assessed in the context of the entire matrimonial relationship, and ordinary quarrels, trivial irritations, or normal wear and tear do not alone establish it.

Under Dr. N.G. Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane, (1975) 2 SCC 326, the applicable standard in matrimonial proceedings is preponderance of probabilities.

Gurbux Singh v. Harminder Kaur, (2010) 14 SCC 301, and Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511, explain that cruelty depends on the nature, persistence, and cumulative effect of the conduct, and that isolated or ordinary marital friction is insufficient.

Under Anil Kumar Jain v. Maya Jain, (2009) 10 SCC 415, consent to divorce by mutual consent under Section 13-B must continue until the decree and may be withdrawn; irretrievable breakdown is not, by itself, a statutory ground for divorce available to the High Court.

An ex parte proceeding does not dispense with the petitioner’s burden to prove the pleaded statutory ground.

The husband’s allegations of quarrels, pressure to live separately, and threats were general and lacked satisfactory particulars of incidents, dates, and their effect on him.

The notarised agreement was not a Section 13-B petition, and the wife’s later withdrawal from the proposed mutual-consent arrangement did not itself amount to cruelty.

The rent agreement named only the husband as tenant; the record did not establish that the wife lived with him in those premises or when any such joint residence began.

Its execution only five days before the divorce petition also did not substantiate the asserted prolonged separation or a course of cruelty during that period.

The wife’s absence did not relieve the husband of his burden of proof, and neither separation nor irretrievable breakdown independently established the pleaded ground.

The Court therefore found no basis to disturb the Family Court’s assessment of the evidence.

It dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Family Court’s judgment and decree dated 15 April 2025; pending applications were disposed of, and the parties were left to bear their own costs.