01Facts
The plaintiffs, Pawan Kumar Saraf, Sailesh Saraf and Sachet Saraf, are co-owners of Plot No. Y-7, Loha Mandi, Naraina, New Delhi.
The defendants, M/s Universal Steel Supply Co. (a partnership firm) and its partners Umesh Kumar Garg and Yogesh Kumar Garg, were permitted to use the middle portion of the plot (90 ft × 22 ft 6 in., 225 sq. yds.) for storing and selling iron and steel goods under successive agreements dated 05.05.1994, 15.05.1996, 01.04.1998, 01.04.2001 and 01.04.2002, with commission of ₹25 per metric tonne payable on quarterly sales.
¶ 4, 63–64The plaintiffs stated that the last agreement expired on 31.03.2004.
¶ 6, 73A legal notice dated 19.11.2005 called upon the defendants to remove their goods, and the defendants replied on 06.12.2005 disputing the licence.
¶ 6The plaintiffs' arbitration claim led to an award dated 08.05.2006, which was set aside under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 on 02.02.2010 (CS No. 82/2006) on grounds concerning the arbitrator's appointment; the parties then went to mediation, which failed.
¶ 8–9, 92The present suit (CS(OS) 1453/2010) was filed in 2010 for possession and mesne profits.
¶ 2The defendants pleaded that they were month-to-month tenants at ₹2,500 per month since 1994, that the suit was barred under Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 ("DRC Act"), that a Section 106 TPA notice was defective, that Smt. Parvati Devi Saraf was a necessary party, and that the suit was barred by res judicata.
¶ 11–17, 19–22During cross-examination of DW-1, the plaintiffs orally sought a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC and abandoned mesne profits.
¶ 28After notice to the defendants, the District Judge, New Delhi, decreed possession by judgment dated 13.03.2026.
¶ 30–3202Issues
i.1. Whether the plaintiffs have locus standi to maintain the suit, given that the last agreement (01.04.2002) was executed by Smt. Parvati Devi Saraf.
¶ 43–49ii.2. Whether the suit is barred under Section 50 of the DRC Act, i.e., whether the subject matter was "premises" under Section 2(i).
¶ 50–61, 89iii.3. Whether the defendants were licensees or tenants, i.e., whether the 1994–2002 arrangements created a lease or a licence.
¶ 62–88iv.4. Whether the licence/lease was validly terminated by the notice dated 19.11.2005.
¶ 90v.5. Whether the suit is barred by res judicata in view of the arbitral award and its setting aside.
¶ 91–94vi.6. Whether Order XII Rule 6 CPC was rightly invoked at a stage when the defendants' evidence was incomplete.
¶ 95–9903Law Applied
Order XII Rule 6 CPC permits judgment on admissions "in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing", and the scope of "or otherwise" is explained in Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Narayan Jaiswal, 2025 INSC 467.
¶ 78–79Section 2(i) DRC Act defines "premises" as a building or part of a building, and a plot of land with a temporary structure is not "premises", following Prabha Manufacturing v. Banwari Lal, AIR 1989 SC 1101, Surinder Kumar Jhamb v. Om Parkash Shokeen, 82 (1999) DLT 569 (DB), and Kamla Devi v. Laxmi Devi, (2000) 5 SCC 646.
¶ 54–58On lease versus licence, substance over form governs, and exclusive possession is prima facie tenancy, rebuttable, as laid down in Associated Hotels of India v. R.N. Kapoor, AIR 1959 SC 1262.
¶ 66–70The intention of the parties is gathered from the document, conduct and surrounding circumstances, as laid down in Delta International v. Shyam Sunder Ganeriwalla, AIR 1999 SC 2607.
¶ 71Sections 105, 107 and 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 govern the nature of the relationship and its determination.
¶ 68–69One co-owner may sue, and the consent of the other co-owners is presumed absent opposition, as laid down in India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. v. Bhagabandei Agarwalla, (2004) 3 SCC 178, with reference to Ambica Prasad v. Mohd. Alam, (2015) 13 SCC 13.
¶ 46–47The object of Order XII Rule 6 CPC is speedy judgment to the extent of admitted entitlement, as laid down in Charanjit Lal Mehra v. Kamal Saroj Mahajan, AIR 2005 SC 2765 and Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. v. United Bank of India, (2000) 7 SCC 120.
¶ 97By analogy, sham defences do not defeat a claim on admissions, as laid down in Mechelec Engineers v. Basic Equipment Corporation, (1976) 4 SCC 687.
¶ 98Absent a timely request under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the arbitration agreement does not bar a civil suit.
¶ 93Provisions in the judgment · 15 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 96
Delhi High Court Act, 1966 Section 10
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Section 8Section 12Section 13Section 16Section 34
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 Section 105Section 106Section 107Section 108
delhi rent control act, 1958 Section 50Section 2
Indian Easements Act, 1882 Section 52
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 Section 7
04Reasoning
On locus standi, the court relied on the defendants' own written statement, which admitted that the plaintiffs were co-lessees/owners under the 1982 perpetual lease, so the execution of the 2002 agreement by Smt. Parvati Devi did not defeat the plaintiffs' standing.
¶ 45, 48–49On the DRC Act, the plaintiffs described the property as a plot with a temporary tin shed, and the defendants admitted in their own pleading that the office and sheds were constructed by them. Since the letting concerned land and not a building, the subject matter fell outside "premises" and Section 50 was not attracted.
¶ 53, 59–61, 89On the nature of the relationship, the court held that the agreements, read with the site plan (undisputed), showed a middle plot demarcated by pillars and shutter access extending to the adjoining plot let on commission to third parties, and commission-based charges, indicated a licence.
¶ 83–85The defendants' Counter-Statement in the arbitration (filed 01.04.2006, before the suit) admitted that the relationship was regulated by the agreements and that payments were made as "commission," which contradicted their written-statement denial. The court treated these pre-suit admissions as usable under Order XII Rule 6 notwithstanding the later setting aside of the award, because the setting aside affected the adjudication and not the admissions of fact.
¶ 78–82The ₹25,000 cheque payment and the rejected ₹27,500 payment did not create a fresh tenancy, as no agreement fixing rent was pleaded and no fresh agreement was entered after 2004.
¶ 86–88The licence expired and was terminated by the 2005 notice to which the defendants replied, so possession followed.
¶ 90On res judicata, the award was set aside on Section 12 grounds, so its findings did not survive, and the setting aside did not adjudicate the merits.
¶ 94On Order XII Rule 6, the stage of the trial did not bar a decree where material facts were clearly admitted, and recording evidence on admitted facts was held to be futile.
¶ 96, 9905Holding
The plaintiffs had locus standi to maintain the suit.
¶ 49The suit was not barred by the DRC Act because the subject matter was land with temporary structures and not "premises".
¶ 61, 89The defendants occupied the suit plot as licensees, though the result would be the same whether they were lessees or licensees.
¶ 83, 100The licence was validly terminated by the 19.11.2005 notice.
¶ 90The suit was not barred by res judicata.
¶ 94The decree under Order XII Rule 6 was rightly passed on clear and unequivocal admissions.
¶ 96–99, 101The appeal was dismissed, the decree for possession dated 13.03.2026 was affirmed, and the pending applications were disposed of.
¶ 102Original Court PDF
M/S Universal Steel Supply Co & Ors.vsPawan Kumar Saraf & Anr.
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