01Facts
The plaintiff, a sister of the defendants (full sister of Defendant No. 1, step-sister of Defendant No. 2), sued for a permanent injunction in OS No. 329/2003 to restrain interference with her possession of a house property bearing CTS No. 2121 at Koregalli, Shahapur, Belagavi.
¶ 3She pleaded that she had lived there with her mother since 1987 after shifting from Mumbai following her husband's death, and that the defendants sought to oust her after her mother died on 25.04.2003.
¶ 3The defendants claimed absolute ownership under their father's bequest, asserted that the mother was given a share under the Will, and contended that the plaintiff was an unauthorized occupant who had created documents to claim residence rights.
¶ 5The trial court framed three issues, including whether the plaintiff proved possession as on the date of suit.
¶ 6The trial court decreed the suit on 21.04.2006.
¶ 8In RA No. 293/2009, the first appellate court set aside the decree on 11.11.2009, holding that the plaintiff's description of the suit property was wrong and that she had not proved possession of the property as described.
¶ 9 · ¶ 16The plaintiff's second appeal was admitted on 07.04.2014.
¶ 11Ex.P1, a CTS extract, showed CTS No. 2121 in the names of the defendants and others.
¶ 20Ex.D1, an order in FDP No. 17/1978 dismissing the plaintiff's and her mother's impleadment application, was relied upon for the defendants' title.
¶ 2102Issues
i.1. Whether the first appellate court committed a serious error in reversing the trial court's decree and dismissing the permanent injunction suit by ignoring material evidence, rendering its judgment perverse and illegal (the substantial question of law framed under Section 100 CPC).
¶ 11ii.2. Whether the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded and proved her right, interest, and the nature of her possession over the suit property.
¶ 20iii.3. Whether the plaintiff furnished a correct description and identification of the suit property, without which protection of possession cannot be granted.
¶ 23 · ¶ 2403Law Applied
Section 100 CPC, under which a second appeal lies only on a substantial question of law, so that concurrent or re-appreciated findings of fact are not disturbed unless perverse.
¶ 11 · ¶ 24Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeira (2012) 5 SCC 370, which holds that a person claiming a right to continue in possession must plead full details, including ownership, date and manner of entry, the capacity of possession, and the basis of the claim, and must support these pleadings with documentary proof.
¶ 19T.L. Nagendra Babu v. Manohar Rao Pawar (ILR 2005 Kar 884) and Ambanna v. Ghanteappa (AIR 1999 Kar 421), which hold that no relief can be granted unless the court is satisfied as to the identification of the property.
¶ 24The trial court's failure to examine title and the nature of possession was a relevant omission.
¶ 15Provisions in the judgment · 1 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 100
04Reasoning
The trial court did not determine title or the nature of the plaintiff's possession, and it gave no clear finding on identity of the property, despite holding that possession was proved.
¶ 15Applying Maria Margarida, the plaint did not disclose the plaintiff's right or interest or the nature of her possession. It described only her residence "along with her children" and the mother's occupation, and the affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief added nothing.
¶ 20Ex.P1 showed that the property stood in the defendants' names, and Ex.D1 showed that the plaintiff's earlier claim to a share had been rejected in FDP No. 17/1978.
¶ 20 · ¶ 21On identification, the boundaries pleaded (East: CTS 2120; West: CTS 2122; North: Bangi passage; South: road) were those of the entire CTS No. 2121, not of the portion occupied by the plaintiff. The plaint gave no measurements, and the hand sketch depicted six rooms against the three rooms and one bathroom claimed.
¶ 23The first appellate court was justified in holding the description "totally wrong," and the plaintiff's possession, being unauthorized and unidentified, could not be protected.
¶ 16 · ¶ 23 · ¶ 24These were treated as findings of fact based on re-appreciation of evidence, and they were not held to be perverse.
¶ 2405Holding
The substantial question of law is answered in the negative. The first appellate court's reversal of the trial court's decree was not perverse, as the plaintiff failed to plead and prove her right or interest, and failed to identify the suit property correctly.
¶ 20 · ¶ 23 · ¶ 24The Regular Second Appeal is dismissed, the first appellate judgment dated 11.11.2009 in RA No. 293/2009 is upheld, and the trial court's decree dated 21.04.2006 in OS No. 329/2003 stands set aside, with the suit consequently dismissed. Pending applications, if any, are disposed of as not surviving.
¶ 16 · ¶ 25Original Court PDF
LEELA @ ANURADHA VILAS MELALKIvsGAJKUMAR KALLAPPA LENGADE
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