Supreme CourtProperty and Real Estate LawAdministrative and Public Law

Supreme Court Sets Aside Mining Land Acquisition Despite Gram Sabha Rejection, Holds Consent Mandatory in Scheduled Areas

Bibol Toppov.State Of Odisha

Supreme Court Sets Aside Mining Land Acquisition Despite Gram Sabha Rejection, Holds Consent Mandatory in Scheduled Areas. Bibol Toppo vs State Of Odisha. Supreme Court. LawLens
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In brief

The question

1. Whether the acquisition, made at the instance of a private company for mining, falls under Section 2(1) or Section 2(2)(b) of the 2013 Act.

The court held

(i) the acquisition falls under Section 2(2)(b) of the 2013 Act, not Section 2(1).

It also directed

(ii) prior consent of 80% of affected families is a pre-condition that must be satisfied before Section 8 examination, and subsequent consent cannot cure non-compliance.

(iii) Section 41(3) Gram Sabha consent is mandatory, and its absence renders the acquisition invalid.

(iv) the Expert Group's composition violated the independence requirement of Section 7.

(v) the MMDR Act and the mining lease do not dispense with the 2013 Act, and Section 24A does not authorise acquisition-free mining.

(vi) the appellants have locus standi, and the challenge should be decided on merits.

The Court allowed the writ petition, set aside the land acquisition along with the relevant notifications and orders, and set aside the impugned High Court judgment.

The decision does not bar fresh acquisition proceedings in accordance with law and the Court's findings.

01Facts

The appellants are residents of Kukuda, Bihabandha and Lanjiberna villages in Sundergarh District, Odisha

¶ 2

The State had granted a mining lease to M/s Dalmia Cements Bharat Ltd. ("the company") under the MMDR Act, extended until 29.02.2040

¶ 2

The company sought surface rights over 273.57 acres of agricultural land within the leased area, which it did not own, and applied for acquisition on 09.12.2015

¶ 2–3

On 23.08.2017, the State granted administrative approval under the Odisha Rules, expressly stating that the prior consent provision of Section 2(2)(b)(i) of the 2013 Act would apply

¶ 3

Both Gram Panchayats unanimously rejected the proposal on 26.01.2020

¶ 4

A public hearing scheduled for 16.04.2021 could not be held due to Covid-19, according to RTI responses

¶ 6

The SIA was evaluated by an Expert Group that included Mr. Ashok Kumar Sahoo, who was the company's Advisor (Land Acquisition)

¶ 7, 45

Declaration under Section 8(2), preliminary notifications under Section 11, and final notification under Section 19 followed, the last issued on 03.11.2021

¶ 8–9

The appellants' writ petition was dismissed by the High Court on 06.09.2024

¶ 1, 11

The High Court held that the acquisition was under Section 2(1), that prior consent was a continuing process, that Section 41(3) was directory, and that the Expert Group's composition was not rigid

¶ 12–16

02Issues

i.1. Whether the acquisition, made at the instance of a private company for mining, falls under Section 2(1) or Section 2(2)(b) of the 2013 Act.

¶ 21–27

ii.2. Whether the prior consent of at least 80% of affected families under the Section 2(2)(b) proviso is a pre-condition that must be satisfied before Section 8 examination, or whether it may be obtained at subsequent stages.

¶ 28–35

iii.3. Whether the prior consent of the Gram Sabha under Section 41(3) for acquisition in Scheduled Areas is mandatory or directory.

¶ 36–43

iv.4. Whether the SIA process, including the public hearing and the composition of the Expert Group under Section 7, was legally valid.

¶ 44–47

v.5. Whether the MMDR Act and the mining lease permit the company to bypass the 2013 Act and obtain surface rights through Section 24A compensation.

¶ 48–56

vi.6. Whether the appellants have locus standi to challenge the acquisition.

¶ 57

03Law Applied

The Court applied Section 2(1)(b) of the 2013 Act, which governs acquisition for public purposes including mining, and Section 2(2)(b), which governs acquisition for private companies for public purposes and requires prior consent of at least 80% of affected families obtained along with the SIA study.

¶ 23–24, 28

The Court read Section 8(3)'s proviso as requiring the government to ascertain that prior consent has been obtained before examining the proposal, and treated Rule 21 of the Odisha Rules (Form J) as prescribing the manner of consent.

¶ 29–32

The Court applied Section 41(3) of the 2013 Act, which makes prior Gram Sabha consent mandatory for all land acquisition in Scheduled Areas before issuance of any notification, and held that sub-sections (1) and (2) are guiding, not mandatory, whereas sub-section (3) is mandatory.

¶ 36–39

The Court relied on Section 7(1) and (2) of the 2013 Act, which require the SIA to be evaluated by an "independent multi-disciplinary Expert Group".

¶ 45–46

The Court applied the principle that a statutory contract between the State and a mining lessee cannot affect the proprietary rights of third-party landowners, and that the 2013 Act and the MMDR Act operate in distinct spheres (Section 103 of the 2013 Act).

¶ 49–50

The Court construed Section 24A of the MMDR Act as limited to compensation for loss or damage, not as a substitute for acquisition.

¶ 52, 54

The Court relied on the principle that a Constitutional Court should not dismiss a challenge on technical grounds where the defect is curable and attributable to State inaction.

¶ 57

Provisions in the judgment · 13 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 12 provisionsSection 2Section 3Section 4Section 5Section 7Section 8Section 11Section 15Section 19Section 30Section 41Section 103

Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 Section 24

04Reasoning

The Court held that the acquisition was for a private company's mining purpose, not for the State's own use, hold or control. The lease's continuation to 2040 and the company's exclusive use defeated the argument that the land would revert to the State, and the dominant purpose test was applied as of the date of acquisition.

¶ 25–27

Because the acquisition fell under Section 2(2)(b), the 80% prior consent requirement applied. The High Court's view that consent could be obtained at any stage was rejected: the statute fixes the stage (along with the SIA and before Section 8 examination), and "prior" consent cannot be cured by later consent.

¶ 29–34

The State's own administrative approval recorded that Section 2(2)(b)(i) applied, which the High Court had wrongly labelled "misquoting". The record showed no Form J consent, and the submission of 482 consenting families was unsupported by material.

¶ 33, 35

On Section 41, the Court rejected the High Court's reliance on "as far as possible" and "demonstrable last resort" to dilute sub-section (3). Those phrases govern the earlier stages; sub-section (3) applies once the government decides to proceed. The absence of a statutory penalty did not make the provision directory, since judicial review flows from the Constitution.

¶ 38–39, 43

The Court also noted the Standing Committee's observation that Gram Sabha consent was being reduced to a "paper formality." Here there was not even paper consent, as both Gram Sabhas had rejected the proposal and no Form M consent existed.

¶ 40–41

On the SIA, the Court found no material that the public hearing took place. The final SIA report recorded no affected persons' views, which supported the appellants' case. Mr. Sahoo's direct financial and professional link to the company compromised the independence required under Section 7(1). The Court reasoned that a person connected to the project proponent cannot be expected to give an independent opinion on public purpose or disproportionate social costs.

¶ 44–47

On the MMDR Act, the Court found the respondents had created an "artificial conflict." The lease governs only the State–lessee relationship and cannot override third-party proprietary rights, and Section 24A provides for compensation for surface damage, not acquisition. Having chosen the 2013 Act route, the respondents could not avoid its requirements by invoking other laws.

¶ 49–54, 56

On locus standi, the Court held that the State could not challenge the appellants' standing when it had failed to update the record of rights, and that a defective affidavit should have been cured, not used to dismiss the petition on technical grounds.

¶ 57

05Holding

(i) the acquisition falls under Section 2(2)(b) of the 2013 Act, not Section 2(1).

¶ 25–27

(ii) prior consent of 80% of affected families is a pre-condition that must be satisfied before Section 8 examination, and subsequent consent cannot cure non-compliance.

¶ 31–34

(iii) Section 41(3) Gram Sabha consent is mandatory, and its absence renders the acquisition invalid.

¶ 39, 41–43

(iv) the Expert Group's composition violated the independence requirement of Section 7.

¶ 46–47

(v) the MMDR Act and the mining lease do not dispense with the 2013 Act, and Section 24A does not authorise acquisition-free mining.

¶ 50, 54, 56

(vi) the appellants have locus standi, and the challenge should be decided on merits.

¶ 57

The Court allowed the writ petition, set aside the land acquisition along with the relevant notifications and orders, and set aside the impugned High Court judgment.

¶ 58

The decision does not bar fresh acquisition proceedings in accordance with law and the Court's findings.

¶ 59
Supreme Court

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Bibol ToppovsState Of Odisha

Supreme Court · November 18, 2026

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