01Facts
The parties executed an “Agreement for Development” on 6 August 2003 concerning the respondents’ undivided 2/9th share in land at Thane.
¶ 2–6, 13, 39–43The agreement provided for development and payment of consideration in instalments, with conveyance to follow payment of all amounts due.
¶ 2–6, 13, 39–43After the respondents terminated the agreement in 2008, the dispute went to arbitration.
¶ 2–6, 13, 39–43The majority award granted the appellant specific performance, fixed an enhanced consideration, and directed conveyance; the dissenting arbitrator rejected the claims.
¶ 2–6, 13, 39–43The District Judge upheld the majority award, but the Bombay High Court set it aside under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
¶ 2–6, 13, 39–43The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.
¶ 2–6, 13, 39–4302Issues
i.1. Whether the majority award could stand where it departed from the agreement’s terms and the stipulated sequence for performance, including the payment and conveyance obligations.
¶ 52–61ii.2. Whether, notwithstanding the setting aside of the award, the respondents were required to refund the amounts received under the agreement, and whether the Supreme Court should grant that relief under Article 142.
¶ 6203Law Applied
The Court applied the unamended Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, applicable because the Section 34 applications were filed before 23 October 2015; an award could be set aside for conflict with public policy, including patent illegality going to the root of the matter.
¶ 44–46Section 28(3) requires an arbitral tribunal to decide in accordance with the contract’s terms.
¶ 49–50, 52Although contractual interpretation is primarily for the arbitrator, an award is vulnerable where the interpretation is not a plausible one or the tribunal effectively rewrites the contract.
¶ 49–50, 52The Court relied on Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority, Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, and related authorities on those principles.
¶ 49–50It also exercised its power under Article 142 to do complete justice.
¶ 62Provisions in the judgment · 6 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Section 28Section 33Section 34Section 37Section 75Section 81
04Reasoning
The agreement prescribed a sequence of obligations: the balance consideration was payable by the specified dates, the total consideration remained subject to later events affecting FSI and other sums, and conveyance was conditional on payment of all amounts due.
¶ 54–61The majority award nevertheless ordered conveyance despite incomplete payment and indeterminate consideration, adopted a new rate without contractual basis, adjusted sums paid under a superseded memorandum, and included property excluded by the agreement.
¶ 54–61It therefore supplanted, rather than interpreted, the contract and violated Section 28(3), warranting the High Court’s interference under Section 34.
¶ 54–61Separately, because no construction had been carried out on the respondents’ share, Clause 54 required them to return the consideration received; their retention of those sums after terminating the agreement justified relief under Article 142.
¶ 6205Holding
The Supreme Court declined to restore the majority award and disposed of the appeals on the basis that the award could not stand for the contractual departures identified.
¶ 61–62Exercising Article 142, it directed the respondents to refund the amounts paid to them under the agreement, with simple interest at 9% per annum from the date of each payment until actual refund.
¶ 62It also directed that the appellant’s sums deposited in court be returned with any accrued interest.
¶ 62The parties were ordered to bear their own costs.
¶ 62Original Court PDF
Shreeram BuildersvsUpendra Kantilal Thanawala
Click to open original judgment
Original judgment, available to read, download and summarize on LawLens.in
