A 36-year delay in enforcing a sale agreement defeats specific-performance relief.

The plaintiff sought specific performance of an alleged agreement of sale dated 24 March 1978, under which the defendants’ grandfather purportedly agreed to sell the suit property for Rs. 2,000, said to have been paid in full.

After the vendor and his son died, the plaintiff’s requests to the defendants to execute a sale deed allegedly went unanswered; the plaintiff issued notice in 2014 and then filed suit.

The trial court found that the plaintiff had not proved execution of the agreement or payment of consideration, found the agreement forged, and held the suit barred by limitation.

The plaintiff’s legal heirs’ first appeal was dismissed.

They challenged both decrees in this second appeal.

1. Whether the plaintiff proved lawful execution of the 1978 agreement and payment of the consideration so as to support a claim for specific performance.

2. Whether the plaintiff’s failure to take steps from 1978 until 2014 disentitled the plaintiff to specific performance.

3. Whether the concurrent findings disclosed a substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The appeal was brought under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which confines second appeals to cases involving a substantial question of law.

The court treated proof of the alleged agreement as necessary to sustain the claim for specific performance and considered the plaintiff’s prolonged inaction relevant to entitlement to that relief.

Although the defendants had raised Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and limitation, the judgment did not separately set out or apply a statutory test under either provision; nor did it cite precedent.

The plaintiff’s claim of possession was unsupported by evidence, while the only identified evidence of execution was the testimony of an alleged attesting witness.

The defendants denied execution, and the retention of the original title deeds by them further supported the lower courts’ conclusion that the agreement was not genuine.

The court also considered the plaintiff’s inaction for approximately 36 years sufficient to disentitle the plaintiff to specific performance.

As the courts below had considered these matters and returned concurrent findings against the plaintiff, the High Court found no substantial question of law warranting intervention.

The High Court dismissed the second appeal, leaving undisturbed the judgments and decrees of the trial court and the first appellate court.