A lease extension expressly subject to mutual consent cannot be compelled by writ.

The petitioner was the successful tenderer under a 5 September 2020 tender to operate a vegetarian fast-food restaurant at BEL Market.

The tender provided for an initial five-year term, with a possible one-year extension by mutual consent, based on the bidder’s performance and credibility.

The petitioner began operations on 1 December 2021, and the five-year term was due to end on 30 November 2026.

The petitioner challenged a subsequent tender notice for restaurant premises at BEL Market and sought an order requiring BEL to extend its lease for one year.

BEL submitted that the petitioner would be permitted to operate until 30 November 2026, but had not consented to an extension.

1. Whether the petitioner was entitled to a one-year extension of the tender or lease after the initial five-year term, notwithstanding the requirement of mutual consent.

2. Whether the Court should quash the subsequent tender notice or otherwise direct BEL to grant the extension.

The Court applied the tender’s express term: the licence was initially for five years, with an additional one-year extension available only “on mutual consent” and based on the highest quoted bidder’s performance and credibility.

In exercising its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the Court held that it could not direct an extension where the contractual requirement of mutual consent had not been met.

No judicial precedents were cited.

The Court construed the tender clause as making the five-year term definite and the further year conditional on the consent of both parties.

Although the petitioner relied on its asserted blemish-free performance and the reference to performance and credibility, BEL had not consented to the extension.

The Court therefore declined to compel BEL to grant an additional year.

It separately accepted BEL’s undertaking that the petitioner’s operations would not be impeded before 30 November 2026.

BEL was bound by its statement that the petitioner could operate until 30 November 2026.

The petitioner remained free to seek an extension by representation, which BEL could consider independently.